of the expedition being fully accomplished, the regiment returned at dark to the foot of the mountain.

September 7, 7 a. m., leaving all trains in rear, except ambulances and hospital wagons, with one regiment as guard, moved forward with Sirwell's and Stanley's brigades, arriving at McKaig's, foot of mountain, at 10 a. m.

12 m. arrived at top of mountain, which had been gained by General Beatty at 11 a. m., without any resistance from the enemy.

4 p. m. First and Second Brigades were on top of mountain; trains ascending slowly. Road very rough and dangerous to transportation.

September 8, 4 a. m., sent General Beatty, with tow regiments, to seize and hold Cooper's Gap.

8 a. m. sent Colonel Stoughton, with the Eleventh Michigan Infantry, to take possession of and clear Stevens' Gap, which was heavily blockaded with fallen trees.

11.30 a. m. arrived at junction of State road and Cooper's Gap road, where the troops were ordered to bivouac for the night.

September 9, 8 a. m., marched the Second and Third Brigades forward via Stevens' Gap, First Brigade moving through Cooper's Gap.

4 p. m. arrived at foot of mountain (Stevens').

5 p. m. moved Stanley's brigade to the front, on a reconnaissance; drove the rebel cavalry 3 1/2 miles. My escort, under command of Lieutenant Cooke, made a gallant charge upon a superior force of the enemy, capturing 2.

September 10, 10 a. m., pursuant to your order, marched my command from Stevens' in the direction of La Fayette.

After passing Bailey's Cross-Roads, my skirmishers were more or less engaged, until we arrived at the gorge leading to Dug Gap, where I halted the command for the purpose of ascertaining the position of the enemy in the gap.

1.30 p. m. I learned from a Union citizen that a large force of the enemy (Buckner's corps), with cavalry and artillery (then only 3 miles distant), was approaching toward my left, from the direction of Catlett's Gap. I immediately sent one regiment in the direction of this force, for the double purpose of a reconnaissance and to compel the enemy to halt, under the impression that I would attack him.

At sundown I made a strong demonstration in the direction of Dug Gap, driving the enemy's skirmishers back to his main force and holding the position until I could establish my picket lines

unobserved.

Before dark the strongest positions of defense the locality afforded were selected with the intention of bivouacking the troops for the night, with my trains parked close to my rear.

From the movements of the enemy, and from information obtained from scouts, I felt confident the enemy proposed to attack me in the morning with a superior force.

I also learned from a prisoner, and from Union civilians, that I was confronted by Hill's corps of three divisions (twelve brigades); that Buckner's corps of two divisions (eight brigades), also Forrest's division of cavalry, were 3 miles to my left, and that Polk's and Breckinridge's commands were in supporting distance. From the concurrence of testimony on this point, there seemed no doubt of the fact. I therefore adopted immediate precautionary measures to guard against surprise.

At 9 o'clock on the evening of the 10th Colonels Stanley and