General Negley toward the left, while the Third was still in position near Nethers' [Withers'] house. I received orders then from General Negley, through Captain Hough, to move forward with the division, which was moving toward the left.

I commenced the movement, when Captain Hough again brought orders for me to move the train into the woods to our left and rear; but owing to the unevenness of the ground I could not do so, but moved down the hill on to the road, as all the rest of the trains had done so and the enemy's shells were then falling near my train. After the last wagon had got into the woods the Third Brigade passed at the quick time. This was about quarter past 11 a. m. I parked my train then on the La Fayette and Rossville road, about a quarter of a mile from the gap, where the road takes a turn to the left going toward Chattanooga, and there waited orders. About half past 2 Lieutenant Cooke, aide-de-camp, brought orders to me from General Negley to move cautiously, as the enemy were marching toward our rear. I had seen this myself, and had already commenced to moved the train toward the gap, so as to be able to place the ridge between my train and the enemy. But seeing the terror the seemed to prevail among the different trains, I sent part of the train through the gap in charge of my sergeant, with instructions to park it as soon as he had got to a convenient place on the left-hand side of the road, whole I remained with the rest of the train (20 wagons) as near the troops as I could with safety to the train. I then turned the train around and went back toward the right, while the gap I had just left was choked up by vehicles of all descriptions, including wagons, ambulances, caissons, guns, besides couriers and stragglers. The enemy had moved to the ridge on which I had my train parked in the forenoon and in rear of the position our division had moved toward in the morning, and had planted a battery and were shelling the gap in which all the trains but mine were jammed up together. Heavy columns of the rebels then moved toward the right from our left (which led me to believe that they had broken through our left center) and in rear of our division. A section of a battery was in position on the ridge in rear of my train, supported by what I supposed to be organized troops.

Finding myself between our lines and the enemy's I concluded it was time to move. But how to do it? The road toward Chattanooga was choked up, and no other way to move unless I could get over the ridge in our rear. I chose the latter, and commenced the movement. Thousands of stragglers passed us, but I could not prevail upon any of them to help my train up to the top of the ridge. I succeeded in getting them all up, however, excepting one wagon, although the enemy were shelling us all the time, and their skirmishers, commencing to advance across the fields, compelled me to abandon the wagon that struck fast. The mules were taken off so the rebels would not remove the wagon, and if we were fortunate enough to regain the ground the wagon and its contents might be recovered. But I am sorry to say that the line of battle I spoke of as ours were not organized troops, and all ran away at the first fire of the enemy. I tried to rally some of the stragglers to support the two pieces that I supposed were still in position, but found that they had either been captured by the enemy or were far in the rear.

At this time I met some of General McCook's staff, and they informed me that the whole line was gone; i. e., that the right wing had been destroyed, and that there were no troops between my train