direct from the general commanding the army, through Lieutenant Parker, of his staff, to move to the extreme right of our line to the support of Major-General Walker, whose division had been for some time warmly engaged, and who reported himself as being heavily pressed by the superior numbers of the enemy, who, subsequent events disclosed, had, or was at this time concentrating, the bulk of his forces on our right and in front of Major-General Walker's command. Moving rapidly by the right flank, I reached the road leading from Alexander's Bridge and at once formed my command immediately in rear of Major-General Walker's line of battle, Jackson's brigade on the right, Smith's in the center, and Wright's brigade on the left, the whole line supported by Maney's and Strahl's brigades, which were held as reserves.

About 12 m. I gave the order to advance, at the same time notifying the several brigade commanders that there was no support on the right or left flank, and after proceeding about 150 yards the line encountered the enemy advancing rapidly in heavy force in pursuit of the retiring columns of Major-General Walker. The left and center of Jackson at once (and in a few moments thereafter the entire line) became engaged, and succeeded in checking the advance of the enemy, and handsomely drove him back with heavy loss to the distance of about three-fourths of a mile, where he took shelter behind his breastworks, and, assisted by the arrival of heavy re-enforcements, checked the farther advance of my line. Without support either on my right or left, and after a severe engagement of two hours, I directed the three brigades to retire for reformation, and ordered Generals Maney and Strahl to occupy and hold the positions vacated by Jackson and Smith and make no attempt to advance. Reaching the positions assigned them, Maney's and Strahl's brigades were attacked in front and on both flanks by the superior numbers of the enemy and forced to retire and take position in rear of Jackson's and Smith's brigades, which were moved forward in the position held before the advance, and on the right and left of Turner's battery. The enemy, flushed with a supposed victory, boldly advanced upon my line, and coming within short range was checked and forced back in disorder by the well-directed discharges of shell and canister from the guns of Turner's battery. I made no effort to advance my line after this success, for the reason that the enemy's dispositions on my right and left flank, and from information derived from prisoners captured, satisfied me that the entire corps of the Federal General Thomas, re-enforced by the divisions of Van Cleve and Palmer, were in my front. I deemed it prudent, therefore, to simply hold my position and await the arrival of re-enforcements.

The result of this engagement of about three hours' duration against such heavy odds, with both flanks exposed, was that my command successfully checked the advance of the enemy, whose purpose seemed to be to seize the crossing of the Chickamauga at Alexander's Bridge and Hunt's Ford. This result was attended with a heavy loss of officers and men, as is attested by the long list of casualties heretofore furnished to the commanding general, and by numerous exhibitions of good conduct on the part of officers and men, particular mention of which is made in the reports of the several brigade commanders, which are herewith forwarded. I cannot, however, forbear to refer to the important service rendered by Lieutenant William B. Turner, commanding battery. Posted on an elevation commanding the approach of the enemy, he used his advantage with