most favorable position in many particulars for a battery. Lieutenant Turner was ordered to leave one piece in position to be used in any emergency which might arise, and retire the remaining three to this hill top and there take position and await further orders. Some moments after this I heard a battery open in rear of the right of my line, and, hastening to it, I found that Forrest had been forced in on my right. General Forrest in person was with the battery, which was firing obliquely to the front and right, and, as I thought, too much in range with two companies of my right regiment, which had been thrown out as flankers to this part of my line. General F[orrest] was apprised of this fact and requested to oblique his guns more to the right, which he did and continued firing, as he informed me the enemy was certainly approaching in force from that direction. The firing was now constant along my entire front, and the enemy's indicated that his line extended far beyond my left. Forrest's battery was some protection to my right flank, and my single Napoleon, while it could not fire with any effect over the ridge in front, was in position to rake the open field to the left and rear of my line, and to this extent prevent the enemy coming behind us, unless it should first be driven off by sharpshooters lodged on the ridge top under cover of the woods between my line and the field. The action increased in fury, especially on the left, and I was soon convinced that my command was greatly overmatched in numbers. A staff officer was sent with this information to the division genera, and another to my left and rear in search of General Strahl, with the request for him to move up in line with me on the left. Passing myself to the ridge top to the left of my line, I discovered the enemy but a short distance from my left advancing by the flank boldly, and evidently with the purposed of passing through this skirt of wood at right anglers with my line, and thus gain my rear and control of my left flank. The emergency was critical, and, being without a staff officer, I hastened in person to General Strahl, who I found had received my message and was aligning for advance. To avoid delay, I asked him to move forward a single regiment to hold the interval between my left and the open field, and he ordered his right regiment (Colonel Walker's), and perhaps another, to advance immediately. This force made a gallant drive forward and the enemy gave [way] before them. I had about this time received the order to fall back and form behind Smith's brigade, which was in line with my guns on the hill top in the rear. My line was retired in as good order as its shattered condition would admit of. Before reaching Smith's line I was instructed to continue my infantry back to the ordnance wagons for a supply of ammunition. The ammunition replenished, my command again moved forward, and bivouacked for the night in line with and on the left of the division without further engagement of my infantry for the day.

My advance gun, under the immediate command and efficient management of First Lieutenant Smith, after covering the retiring line with several well-directed shots at short range, was withdrawn to the hill top and took position with the other three, the battery, by order of the division general, being retained there with the line formed to check the enemy's advance. The service it here rendered in checking and driving back the enemy's advancing lines did not occur under my immediate eye, but is reported as brilliant and decisive. The enemy, pressing forward on what he deemed our yielding lines, was met by shot and shell, and then double charges of