tion, constituting the left of Cleburne's division, near sundown on the 19th, General Deshler informed me that the division was going to advance on the enemy, and owing to the lateness of the hour and the roughness of the country, he did not think my battery could be made effective with safety, but that, in the absence of other orders, I should follow in rear of the brigade, and if he desired the battery he would send for it. After the infantry commenced advancing to the attack I was informed that Major Hotchkiss desired the batteries of the division on the right of Wood's brigade. I moved in that direction, but before I arrived at that point the infantry were engaged in my front, when I thought, owing to the musketry fire on my flank, that I had best order my battery "left into line" to present my front to the fire, and also to be in an offensive and defensive position in the event that our infantry were forced to retire. I remained in this position for several minutes, during which time a large number of infantrymen (200 or 300)-apparently a disorganized, routed, or panic-stricken regiment of Wood's brigade-ran through my battery. Attempting to rally these men and failing, I moved my battery 200 yards to the left in a good position, somewhat in rear of where I supposed Deshler's brigade to be, and, unlimbering the guns, I then turned the battery over to Lieutenant Bingham and rode to where Captain Semple's battery was firing to see Major Hotchkiss, but failed to find him. It being quite dark, I returned and carried my battery to the right and reported to Captain Semple. Learning that Major Hotchkiss had been wounded and removed from the field. I remained during the night in this position.

On the morning of the 20th, I received orders to report back to General Deshler, which I accordingly did, and at 9 or 10 o'clock was again informed by him that we would move to attack the enemy, and that I should follow the brigade when practicable, and to use my judgment about positions,&c. When the brigade moved it marched by the front some distance, crossing quite a quantity of felled timber, which was impassable for a battery. I rode up to the right of the brigade and then to the left, and found the passage best some distance to the left.

In the meantime the brigade moved by the right flank, as I supposed to gain ground to the right, and marched again by the front. As my battery was passing this defile a battery of the enemy opened a dangerous fire on my flank, and finding myself immersing into an open field several hundred yards in width, commanded by two heavy batteries of the enemy, I halted under the cover of a hillock to examine the ground. Finding my brigade had taken position farther to the right than I had supposed it would, and being under a considerable fire (having had 1 horse killed and 1 wheel shot down), I moved back at a gallop through the fallen timber and under the cover of a hill to the right in the direction of my brigade, which I was informed was in reserve.

In extricating my battery from this position I had 1 horse killed by the enemy's batteries. As I advanced to take position with my brigade, I met General Cleburne, who ordered me to remain in position at the crest of a hill, where Wood's and Polk's brigades subsequently joined me. Here I remained until about 4 p.m., when, together with Polk's and Wood's brigades and Semple's battery, I advanced to a position 300 yards from the enemy's breastworks and opened on them with shell. After firing fifteen or twenty minutes