to support Cheatham's division. I was on the ground at daylight ready for the attack. The attack was not made at that time, and between about 9 and 10 I was ordered, instead of supporting Cheatham, to support Hill's corps [a part of the right wing], commanded by Polk, to form my reserve so as to echelon Breckinridge, who was on the right of Hill's corps. Before I got into my position, and while marching by the flank to gain the ground to the right, I was sent for by General Hill to [go to] his support. General Polk was with my command when I received the order. I marched rapidly forward in line of battle, part of the time in double-quick, and reported to General Hill. General Polk was with me. General Hill informed me on my arrival that he wanted a brigade. I told him there was one immediately behind him. He remarked he wanted Gist's brigade. I informed him that it was to the left and had just come up. [General Gist had a few minutes before been put in command by me of General Ector's and Colonel Wilson's brigades, and Colonel Colquitt had command of Gist's brigade.] He ordered General Gist's brigade immediately into the fight in rear of Breckinridge, a part of whose division had fallen back and the whole of which was hard pressed. I refer you to General Gist's report for the performance of his command.

General Walthall was detached to the left to the support of Brigadier-General Polk by Hill or Polk. My command being thus disposed of, brigades being sent in to take the places of divisions, my only occupation was to help form the detached portions of my command as they came out from a position I felt certain they would have to leave when they were sent in. My division commanders received their orders direct from General Hill, and I refer you to their reports. Breckinridge's division having fallen back, General Hill having reported Cleburne's division on Breckinridge's left routed, my Reserve Corps having fallen back in the detachments in which they were sent in, and a column having been observed marching down the Chattanooga road on our right, I was compelled to insist on having something to do with my own command.

With our right flank exposed to their advancing column, and the reported gap that the withdrawal of Cleburne had made on our left, I was in favor of forming the command in a strong position about 150 or 200 yards in rear of us until we ascertained positively the condition of our flanks, and then make the best disposition of the combined force and strike the enemy to the best advantage. General Hill, differing with me, ordered his lines of battle one at right angle to the other, General Breckinridge's being at right angle to mine, he facing northward to oppose the force then coming from Chattanooga, and I facing westward toward the enemy we had been fighting. We were in this position when one of General Polk's aides rode up and told General Hill that General Polk had directed him to order General Hill peremptorily to advance immediately on the enemy. General Gist was then ordered by me to move his division in the direction of the enemy, and General Liddell's division was ordered on his right; Generals Breckinridge and Cheatham were in rear and on General Gist's left. The command marched forward. I refer you to Generals Gist's and Liddell's reports for the result. My command bivouacked on the battle-field and the enemy retreated in the direction of Chattanooga.

I owe it to myself and to the gallant command under me to state

16 R R-VOL XXX, PT II