Shortly after sunrise, hearing nothing from General Hill, I ordered a halt at Morgan's, 4 or 5 miles from Davis'; threw out pickets and sent scouting parties toward Davis' and Lookout Mountain. This was in consequence of information received from citizens and from cavalry detachments, of which I assumed command, that a Federal division was at Davis' and another at Stevens' Gap; and also that Dug and Catlett's Gaps, of Pigeon Mountain, through one of which Hill's troops must march to join me, were, and had been for several days, so heavily blockaded as to be impassable. This intelligence, which was confirmed by my scouts, was communicated to General Hill [see Exhibit B], and to army headquarters [see Exhibit C] and instruction asked.

The troops being now rested, and having obtained water from the Chickamauga, which bends close to the road at Morgan's, I moved forward 1 mile to Conley's, where there is a spring, the last convenient water before reaching Davis'. The several roads leading to Lookout Mountain remained in front of this position, except one diverging at Morgan's, on which I left a strong picket. The road leading through Catlett's Gap and thence to La Fayette was immediately at hand, affording an easy way of retirement, if cleared of obstructions as promptly as I anticipated. I could not perform this labor, having with me no engineer company or working tools.

During the day I learned from scouts and citizens that a large Federal force had moved within the preceding twenty-four hours from Stevens' Gap toward Davis', and that a considerable force yet remained at the foot of Lookout Mountain. Late in the afternoon I received at the foot of Lookout Mountain. Late in the afternoon I received from army headquarters a copy of a communication of Brigadier-General Wood, of Hill's corps, dated Dug Gap, 12.20 p.m., stating that the enemy, with infantry, artillery, and cavalry, was three-quarters of a mile in his front, advancing, and had charged and broken his cavalry; that he thought it a movement in force, and needed support. [See Exhibit D.] With this was a copy of a note from General Hill, dated 1.30 p.m., stating that he had ordered Cleburne's division to Dug Gap, and that if the enemy was attacking there it would be a good time for me to attack in rear. [See Exhibit E.] It was indorsed on these copies that they were referred to me for my information and guidance. In the absence of more definite instructions, I supposed this to mean that I was to advance and attack the enemy when General Hill should engage him, but no such contingency happened. Shortly afterward the enemy advanced upon the cavalry in my front, under Colonel John T. Morgan, which retired skirmishing, and I formed line of battle, expecting an attack.

At 4.45 p.m. General Buckner reached Morgan's with his corps, and reported to me for orders. I directed him to bivouac there, because the water at Conley's was insufficient for the whole force, and because holding that position secured my retirement through Worthen's Gap, should it become necessary.

Brigadier-General Anderson was now put in command of my division.

Previous to General Buckner's arrival I received from army headquarters a communication, dated 8 a.m., addressed to me at Davis' Cross-Roads, informing me of the instructions to him [see Exhibit F], and inclosing a letter from General Hill, dated 4,25 a.m., stating his inability to co-operate with me because of the weakness of Cleburne's division and the obstructions in the passes of Pigeon Mountain. [See Exhibit G.]