CORINTH, October 9, 1863.

Major-General HURLBUT:

I think Sweeny had better take one brigade of Sherman's and leave another at La Grange. Cavalry have been repulsed; are somewhat discouraged and are very tired. Hatch seems to think the enemy has been re-enforced from Holly Springs, and all seem to think him strong enough to attack the ordinary force at La Grange. Better have too many than too few.

E. A. CARR,

Brigadier-General.

CORINTH, October 9, 1863.

Major-General HURLBUT:

Phillips and McCrillis were at Salem yesterday. Rebels, about 4,000, under Chalmers or Lee, attacked them fiercely; fought them all the afternoon and drove them back. Sweeny has but 1,500 infantry. Cannot some of Sherman's men be placed under him so that he can move out and attack?

E. A. CARR,

Brigadier-General.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., October 9, 1863.

Brig. General E. A. CARR,

Corinth, Miss.:

Sweeny has been ordered to take his command and leave Spooner's brigade of Sherman's corps at La Grange. With his infantry, artillery, and cavalry he will have enough.

S. A. HURLBUT,

Major-General.

CORINTH, MISS. (Received October 9, 1863.)

General SWEENY:

It seems to me that the enemy is beset by our cavalry on every side. I think you had better march out your force of infantry and artillery and attack him if he is so near. At all events defend the crossing of Wolf River and fight him on the most favorable ground. If he attacks I leave it to your judgment whether to march out and attack. If you do so I am told that there are one or two train loads of troops at Moscow, who can be called to your support. There are also others on trains constantly coming east. If they have come to a head, it will be altogether best to attack them, and you can get all the support you need by telegraphing to General Hurlbut. It you go out, assume command of cavalry and all.

E. A. CARR,

Brigadier-General.

FORT MONROE, October 9, 1863. (Received 2.30 p.m.)

Major ECKERT:

Atlanta Appeal, of October 3, mentions removal of Generals Polk and Hindman as a scapegoat for Bragg in his failure at Chickamauga,