the Tennessee between [us], which was answered, saying they had, and destroyed 400 wagons for us near Anderson, in Sequatchie Valley.

They went from there to McMinnville, where they did some damage and captured some Tennesseeans. Thence they went to Murfreesborough and got repulsed; thence to Wartrace, where they were served in a similar manner; thence to Shelbyville, which they sacked. There they were overtaken by our cavalry and whipped, losing four pieces of artillery and 200 killed. Our cavalry are after them toward Columbia and Fayetteville, with reasonable prospects of destroying or capturing them.

Meanwhile I am anxiously waiting to hear from you. If your cavalry could not co-operate with ours in the pursuit, I had hoped it would do one of two things: Firstly, to close down on the north side of Tennessee or south side, opening communication with us completely beyond the power of interruption, in which alone is there any security in co-operation; or, secondly, to make a terrible raid on the enemy's railroad and other communications, now comparatively at your mercy in the absence of the cavalry, which may never return.

Please let me know if I may expect any aid; if so, what assistance from you, and how and where you propose to operate.

Your first plan was the only one when you wrote some other may prove better if you are still waiting.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. S. ROSECRANS,

Major-General, Commanding.

CHATTANOOGA, October 9, 1863-8.36 p.m.

General BURNSIDE:

No news from you since your question of the 4th. Have dispatched you to-day by messenger. Our cavalry has overtaken the rebels at Shelbyville-whipped well; is pursuing them southwardly. Since yours did not join them, I hoped you would make them open communication with us and watch the Tennessee from Kingston to Blythe's Ferry, or that you would make a damaging raid on the rebel railroad and other communications, now quite open from absence of their cavalry.

What may we expect from you? You should cover our left, and open communication beyond the power of its being interrupted by the enemy should he attempt to throw himself between us. The enemy are directly in our front, but hills conceal their if you can act with us, and in what way. Don't be caught between upper and nether millstone.

W. S. ROSECRANS,

Major-General.

LEBANON, October 9, 1863-1.30 a.m.

Brigadier-General BOYLE:

We are in line of battle, expecting an attack momentarily. We have force enough to whip them if they attack us, we think; if not, we will pursue them in the morning if not attacked to-night.

JOHN A. MORRISON,

Lieutenant-Colonel Thirteenth Kentucky Cavalry.