third line of works, making a brief stand at his second line. He was closely pursued into the works on this new line, but so much delay had been caused by the bad state of the roads that I could not get the troops into position for another attack until it was too late to make the attempt. During the following night the enemy retreated, taking the road through Averasborough.

In this action we captured 3 pieces of artillery, 1 caisson, and several ambulances; also 175 prisoners. We buried on the field 128 of their dead. The loss in the two corps was 564 killed and wounded. *

All of our troops behaved extremely well. The cavalry under General Kilpatrick exhibited great gallantry, and, although the ground was unfavorable for the movement of cavalry, it did most excellent service.

On the 17th of March the Fourteenth Corps crossed Black River and encamped near Mingo Creek. The Twentieth Corps encamped near Black River. On the night of the 18th the Fourteenth corps encamped near Mill Creek, and the Twentieth Corps about five miles in rear of the Fourteenth. On the 19th the march was resumed at 7 a.m., the Fourteenth Corps still in advance. Our advance was stubbornly resisted from the che march, but one of our cavalry officers came to me while our advance was skirmishing with the enemy and informed me that he had escaped from the enemy only two days before, and that when he left Smithfield he knew the main army under General Johnston to be at or near Raleigh. This statement was confirmed by deserters. I believed the only force in my front to consist of cavalry with a few pieces of artillery, and sent word to this effect to General Sherman. Under this impression I pressed forward rapidly. On reaching the point at which the road from Smithfield runs into the Goldsborough road, on which we were marching, I found the enemy intrenched. Carlin's division was at once deployed, Buell's brigade being sent some distance to the left of the road for the purpose of developing the enemy's line. Morgan's division was thrown on the right of Carlin, with two brigades in line and one in reserve. Both Carlin and Morgan were ordered to press the enemy closely and force him to develop his position and strength.

I soon became convinced that I had to deal with something more formidable than a division of cavalry. While still in doubt, however, as to the strengthen of the enemy, a deserter was brought to me who stated that he was formerly a Union soldier, had been taken prisoner, and while sick had been induced to enlist in the rebel service. He informed me that General Johnston had, by forced marches, concentrated his army in my front; that it was understood among the rebel soldiers that this force amounted to 40,000 men; that they were told that they were to crush one corps of Sherman's army. He stated that General Johnston had ridden along his line that morning and been loudly cheered by his old Tennessee army. While he was giving me these interesting particulars a member of my staff approached and recognized in this deserter an old acquaintance. They had entered the service in 1861 as private soldiers in the same company. The statements of this man and the developments made by Morgan and Carlin guard. I at once concluded to take a defensive position and communicate with the commanding general. Robinson's brigade, of the Twentieth Corps, had already reached the field and been

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*But see revised table, p. 66.

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