already attracted the attention of the enemy on the north side of the large field, as shown in the within diagram. * Before we had developed our own strength, however, to the enemy orders reached us to return and take position on the left of General Hobart's brigade, with my left refused. This order was obeyed as quickly as possible and temporary barricades commenced. A heavy line of skirmishers, under Captain Rowe, of my staff, was also thrown well in front, and extending far to my left, crossing a road which led from the enemy's lines around my left and in my rear. A detachment of mounted foragers were also thrown out on this road, with orders to build a barricade at a point some half a mile in front, where this road made a right angle leading into the enemy's lines. My command has been in this last position but a few minutes when it was again ordered to re-attempt the same flank movement, but was soon again recalled and ordered to charge the enemy immediately on General Hobart's left. In attacking the enemy my command moved in two lines and in good order, with the front line firing and with orders for the rear line to charge through it in case it faltered. The front line (Twenty-First Michigan and Sixty-ninth Ohio) faltered within a few feet of the enemy's works. The rear line (Thirteenth Michigan) charged to the front line and likewise faltered immediately in front. About this time the enemy commenced firing into both flanks with musketry and with artillery from our right. Although every effort was made to hold the line it slowly gave back to the crest of a small ridge on the north side of a creek or swamp. About 300 yards in rear on the north side of this swamp, as shown in diagram, we commenced throwing up temporary shelter, for my men on the left of and a little in advance of General Hobart's left, which was drawn below the crest of the ridge. During all this time my line of skirmishers extended far into the woods on west side of the field on my left.

Soon after our attack was repulsed a report came to me that a heavy column was moving around my left and to my rear under cover of the timber. I immediately reported it, and also sent the Sixty-ninth Ohio (numbering less than 100 men) to support the two companies that were then engaged with the enemy far to my left. Before my works were more than half completed the enemy attacked. Both our brigades repulsed the first attack. During the second attack the line immediately on my right as far as I could see gave way, and the enemy passed over the works, so that my brigade, which still stood, was almost entirely cut off. In this condition, with both flanks turned and no reserve, I concluded that to remain there longer was to sacrifice my brigade. Hence I gave the order to fall back. My division commander was present, superintending the movements when we made the attack on the enemy, and also when the enemy attacked us, doing all any one man could do to encourage the men, not only with words, but by exposing his own person. At the time the enemy drove the troops on my immediate right General Carlin was just at the right of my line, but was evidently not aware of the condition of thins to his fight, for he was at that time looking intently to the front at the enemy as he faltered before the fire of my men. At first I waited for him to order, but seeing that too much delay would cause our certain capture, and there being no time for consultation, I ordered the retreat. Half a minute's delay, and General Carlin, myself, and most of my brigade would have been captured. My command fell back, with the enemy

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* To appear in the Atlas.

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