our march, leaving the Raleigh road and striking in the direction of Goldsborough. On the 18th instant we struck the enemy about noon, formed line of battle, and drove him about four miles, when we went into camp. The next day, March 19, the First Division having found the enemy in force, our command was placed in position on the extreme right of the line, this regiment and the Fourteenth Michigan occupying the front line, the ground in every direction being very swampy. The enemy were found intrenched in our front, and we hastily constructed light breast works of old logs ans pine trees. Before our works were completed the enemy charged furiously, driving in our skirmish line and advancing within seventy-five yards of our works. Our fire, however, was too severe to be withstood, and their line broke and ran in confusion. In a few moments they charged again with redouble fury all along the right and right center of the line. In our immediate front they were again repulsed, with terrible loss, and the Fourteenth Michigan and Sixtieth Illinois, on our immediate right, charged their broken line in turn and drove them in confusion back over their own works. As serious doubts were entertained regarding the result of this charge further to the left I deemed it best to hold my regiment in their works in readiness for any emergency that might arise in that direction. The worst fears were soon realized by the enemy sweeping down in column by regiments on my immediate rear. My men immediately jumped to the others side of their works, receiving a withering fire as they did so. The enemy were quickly checked, however, by the rapid and effective fire that was poured into them from our works. At this juncture the Fourteenth Michigan and Sixtieth Illinois, who had charged to the front, returned and, seeing the enemy much demoralized by our fire, charged them in turn and captured or routed the whole force. As firing had again commenced in front I thought it best to place my regiment in rear of their works and hold them there in readiness to repel another attack should one be made from the front. Heavy firing was kept up till long after dark, and several ineffectual attempts were made to drive in our skirmish line; it was, however, considerably advanced, and we held in our possession all the rebel killed and most of their wounded.

That night we lay behind our breast-works on the wet ground, without fire, and the most of us with nothing to eat. The next morning both lines retained the same relative position. About noon I was ordered to report with the regiment to Lieutenant-Colonel Grummond, commanding Fourteenth Michigan Infantry. The two regiments were formed in line outside of the works and charged the works of the enemy in our front, which we found deserted. Without throwing out any skirmishers or stopping to reform our lines, we were ordered to forward again at double-quick. The ground was exceedingly swampy and covered with a dense growth of underbrush and vines, fallen logs, &c.

Through this we rushed, without slackening our speed, for nearly half a mile, when we were met by a withering fire of musketry and by grape and canister from four guns, which the enemy had in position on our left flank. When we received this fire the men were completely exhausted by marching at double-quick so long over such ground, and by the same cause our line was confused, broken, and disorganized. There was not even a semblance of a company organization, and yet we were not permitted to stop for a moment, but were rushed ahead still on double-quick until the left of my regiment was within thirty yards of the rebel breast-work, from which we were receiving a most destructive fire of musketry and artillery upon our left flank, while another line