to within two miles of Fayetteville, N. C., and went into camp at 2 p.m. March 12, left camp at 6 p.m., crossed the Cape Fear River at 9 p.m., and went into camp behind rebel fortifications on the north side. March 13, moved two miles for change of camp. March 14, remained in camp all day. March 15, left camp at 9 a.m. ; marched twelve miles as rear guard for trains. March 16, left camp at 6 a.m., arched about eighth miles, and met the enemy strongly intrenched near Black River ready to dispute our farther advance. My regiment went into position about 2 p.m., on the right of the second line; at 4 p.m. I moved in reserve of the brigade, and at sundown took position on the left of the front line for the purpose of filling a gap then existing between the First and Third Brigades. I established my line seventy-four yards of the enemy's line of fortifications and constructed works. My loss was one man wounded severely. The enemy retreated during the night. March 17, left camp at 8 a.m., forded Black River and Black Mingo Creek, and after a march of ten miles went into camp for the night. March 18, left camp at 5. 30, marched eleven miles, and went into camp for the afternoon and night.

March 19, left camp at 9 a.m. and marched about four miles down the Goldsborough road and turned into the right; moved about half a mile in this direction and went into position on the right of the second line, in which position we remained about two house, when we, with the brigade, were ordered out and directed to push across to the road to our left. In this movement the brigade was in single line, with my regiment on the left. After wading through numerous swamps, over bushes, vines, and briers, we reached a position and formed line parallel with the road. This advance was disputed all the way [by] rebel skirmishers, to meet which I ordered out as skirmishers two companies commanded by Captain Holloway. Our new formation on the road was scarcely completed when heavy firing on the right of the brigade denoted that the contest was to be a severe one. Stepping into the road and casting my eyes in the direction of the firing, I observed a strong column of the enemy, four lines, deep, moving against the point where I supposed the right of the brigade rested. My suppositions soon proved correct, and after a brief contest I observed that the right was giving way before the advance of the rebel column. At this instant a line of rebels struck my front and that of the left wing of the Twenty-second Indiana on my right. This line was met by our troops without yielding an inch, and after a severe fight of five minutes the rebels fell back and were easily kept at bay by a strong line of skirmishers. But not so on my right, for this time the main column of the enemy had advanced to within 100 yards of the right of my regiment, and the left wing of the Twenty-second Indiana on my right was beginning to give way. My position was fast becoming untenable; besides, I was apprehensive that the confusion incident to a repulse on the right of the brigade might result to the enemy's advantage in making many captures, and I determined at once to defeat as far as possible this object and at the same time better my own situation; to do which I immediately executed a change of front to the rear, and thus presented a front direct to that of the enemy. This movement was not executed by the entire regiment at once nor after the approval system of battalion drill, but by detaching two companies at a time from the right and placing them on the new alignment. In this was I kept most of my line continually firing upon the advancing column. This change, which gave me the advantage of a direct fire, induced the enemy to move by the left flank and deployed his four depths of column