rear. The rest of the division passed, leaving the First Brigade to protect the rear. I was very much dissatisfied with my position, but owing to the quicksand around me could not better it-on a rise of ground, woods in rear, devoid of protection for limbers or caissons, in rear of and above the rail barricades, with woods to the front and left, distant but about 500 yards, with the dismounted cavalry in the barricades in front of the guns in myh way, so that I could not fire without firing over their heads, impracticable for canister and dangerous for shell, especially after dark. Two regiments formed my support on the left, facing to the front and left flank; the balance of the brigade was on the right. I did not know their positions. At dusk the enemy's cavalry charged, mounted, from the woods on the left of the road (I was on the right) and I commenced firing by order of Colonel Jordan, commanding brigade; seven shells in connection with the fire of the other troops drove the enemy back and they troubled us no more. Via Morven, N. C., pontoon bridge at Rocky Mount Post-Office, S. C., Rockingham, N. C., to Fayetteville, N. C., which the command reached March 11, was severe marching for Artillery, killing several horses by overwork on rough, muddy roads, and in swamps so near impassable that the carriages had to be hauled through by hand, the horses not being able to stand up in the road. March 15, from Fayetteville across pontoon bridge to the vicinity of Averasborough I marched in the rain and mud at a trot. The road was rough and muddy and tried my horses as much as any march in the campaign. The next morning the First Brigade advanced a mile or more toward Averasborough, and were skirmishing heavily before I was ordered on the field. By order of General Kilpatrick I came in battery on a rise of ground in an open field on the left of the road, and distant about 1,500 yards from the enemy's earth-works, behind which was a battery of four guns, 12-pounder brass, which opened fire upon me while I was coming up the road and getting into position. The enemy's battery was on about the same plane as my guns, level open ground between, except a wooded ravine about 200 yards in my front, which partially screened my guns from the enemy's fire. I commenced firing with singularly good effect as reported by prisoners taken. The first five shots fired (fuse-shell) took effect, each killing a man or horse. The third shot fired exploded a limber. During the time I was in action, and before any other guns opened on the enemy I received notice that I had dismounted one of their guns-hit it on the fuse. The position of our lines I knew nothing of, except the heaviest musketry was in the woods to my right. I attracted and kept the fire of the enemy's battery directed upon me, so that as far as I could learn not a man of the cavalry division was injured by their fire. I was ordered to cease firing by Captain Beebe, chief of Artillery of the cavalry division, and was immediately after relieved by the Artillery of the Twentieth Army Corps. Ammunition expended, 150 rounds, about equal parts fuse shell and case-shot. That evening the command moved to Black River and bivouacked. From Black River to Mount Olive the battery was not engaged. The fuses provided for 3-inch rifled guns I have found very defective, not over half of the shells exploding. The superiority of the 3-inch rifle over the 12-pounder Napoleon at 1,500 yards was very marked. I had no casualties of men or horses, while my fire was very destructive to the enemy. The caissons for field Artillery are ill-adapted for cavalry service. My experience has been that one-third more horsed are killed by overwork on the caissons than on the pieces. Taking off the spare wheel and rear ammunition chest would equalize the draughts.