had a favorable location to rake the open field and to command the approaches by the road and through the woods. It was but too evident that the whole army of Price and Van Dorn would soon make its appearance and give us battle from the ominous stillness on my right and left flanks.

The following dispositions of troops to meet the emergency were made: Hackleman's brigade, now numbering 1,211 men and officers, on the right, and his right nearly resting on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad; General Oglesby's on Hackleman's left, with 576 men and officers; the artillery, under command of Major Stone, eleven pieces, of all calibers, and 264 men and officers. Total infantry, 1787. Total artillerists, 264.

The day was intensely hot, and, the men having been twelve hours under arms, many had fallen from sheer exhaustion, sun-stroke, and other casualties.

The regiments were disposed in the following order, commencing from the right to the left: Fifty-second Illinois, Second Iowa, Seventh Iowa, Twelfth Illinois, Eighty-first Ohio, Ninth Illinois, eleven pieces of artillery, and the Union Brigade well over to the left and a little in front and nearly over to the Memphis and Charleston road, to cover the left of the artillery. While the troops were moving into position I received the following circular from General Rosecrans:

CIRCULAR.] 2 P. M.

For fear of a misunderstanding in relation to my orders, I wish it distinctly understood that the extreme position is not to be taken till driven to it.

By order of Major-General Rosecrans:

S. C. LYFORD,

Acting Aide-de-Camp.

The troops had just got their positions when the enemy presented themselves, moving through the open field and the woods. We sent him a welcome in one of our 20-pounder guns, to which politeness they returned the compliment. All of our eleven guns were soon at work, forgetting the artillery stationed at a pleasant range in the vicinity of the house in the open field. The infantry essayed time and again to advance and their artillery helped them in every way possible. The most murderous fire on their column was kept up for one hour and a half, keeping the whole Confederate force at bay. Twice our libbers were filled up with artillery ammunition, from a six-mule team running to Corinth. The artillery ammunition failed, and the supply not coming up in time, Major Stone, chief of artillery, ordered them to limber to the rear and came to me for orders. I told him to proceed to Corinth with all dispatch, fill up with ammunition, and return and take the most favorable position he could get in line with Fort Robinett. The artillery filed slowly to the rear, men looking more like coal-heavers than soldiers, with perspiration streaming down their faces blackened with gunpowder, and the wounded horses leaving a stream of blood in the road.

The artillery had fired, of all calibers, over 1,500 rounds of artillery ammunition, and still no re-enforcements had arrived and no attack made on the right and left flanks and rear of the enemy to support me. I again sent down to General Rosecrans asking for re-enforcements, telling him I feared I could not hold my position unless they were sent.

I feel it my duty to state the reasons assigned by Colonel Du Bois, aide-de-camp to General Rosecrans, why the reserve did not arrive