turn our left flank through the woods, and the position being unfavorable to meet such a movement except at great disadvantage, I ordered a retrograde movement of the troops 725 yards, being 675 yards from the railroad in Corinth, and form fifth line of battle on Fort Robinett. The movement was executed at common time, no enemy appearing to interfere. The artillery by this timed had been to Corinth, filled up with ammunition, and taken up their position in obedience to orders. The infantry were disposed in line of battle, stretching across the abatis to infantry were disposed in line of battle, stretching across the abatis to the right, the left supporting the artillery, resting on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. We heard nothing more of the enemy, excepting a few straggling shots, till just sundown, when he sent forward a small reconnaissance upon the Columbus road. My artillery stationed on the railroad opened them,and the same time Mower's battery gave them a little canister. These few shots sent them to the rear flying, and we saw no more of the enemy that night. Thus ended the hard work of Friday, October 3, and the battle of the white house.

I regret exceedingly that I had not the advice and suggestions of our commanding general on this day, but with the exception of the orders heretofore reformed to in this report I do not remember to have received any. The exhausted troops now sank to rest and silence reigned, a striking contrast to the day's din of battle.

I visited Corinth to look after the wounded. In one room I found my three brigade commanders. General Hackleman breathed his last while I was with him. General Oglesby was undergoing most excruciating pain. Colonel Baldwin was sickened from the effects of his wounds. The Tishomingo Hotel was crowded with the wounded and dying of my command. I then reported to Major-General Rosecrans, and stated to him that the services of my three brigadier-generals were lost, many of my command on the following day, although the men would do all they could. He therefore ordered me into the reserve for October 4, and to take up my position east of the town, near Major-General Ord's headquarters. The order was executed before 12 o'clock. About 11 o'clock General Hamilton called upon me and delivered an order from General Rosecrans that my division should occupy an earthwork on the line of battle on the northwest of the town, facing the Purdy road.

I am satisfied from the accounts given by rebel prisoners and other sources that the Second Division, Army of West Tennessee, had to contend with the combined forces of Van Dorn and Price during and Price during this day. Their loss must have been very heavy, as I was informed by surgeons and prisoners that they were conveying their dead and wounded to the rear during the whole of Friday night, and in corroboration of this view I extract the following from Southern papers:

MOBILLE, October 8.-A special to the Advertiser and Register, dated Tupelo, 7th, says: "Having driven in the enemy's skirmishers, the combined forces of Van Dorn and Price attacked them in their intrenchments at 9 a. m. on Friday, driving them out and capturing nine pieces of artillery [should be three]. They continued slowly driving them back till night-fall. Our loss was heavy during they day. Phifer's and Green's brigades suffered most. General Martin was killed. Colonels MacFarlane, Erwin, and Moore were seriously wounded."

It has been ascertained by prisoners that General Martin was killed at the charge against General Oglesby's brigade at the Confederate breastworks, and that the whole charge numbered 16,000 men, in three columns.

Our loss in the First and Second Brigades in casualties was about

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