Question. When did the engagement with the enemy cease on the first day of the attack at Corinth?

Answer. The firing continued until late in the evening-nearly night. The firing continued on the left long after it ceased on the right.

Question. Do you know what was the condition of the men at that time from thirst and fatigue and the march of the day?

Answer. I cannot tell. I saw none of General Price's command. On the right the men were in first-rate fighting condition. From time to time mounted men were sent with their canteens for water, and they had not been engaged on the right as they had been on the left. Our engagement had been brief, comparatively.

Question. Do you think it would have been advisable to commence an attack on the town of Corinth, and inner entrenchments after dark?

Answer. The moon was very bright, and if the men on the left were as anxious to attack as those on the right I would have attacked that night before the enemy could have received re-enforcements. I think the enemy wee whipped that night, all who were there, and I would have attacked with more hope of success before the enemy had received re-enforcements than after they were there.

Question. At Tuscumbia Bridge you thought the attack on Corinth must necessarily be unsuccessful. Did you not change your opinion at the end of the first day's fight?

Answer. I still had misgivings, doubts, and fears. My opinion was changed. My opinion was changed because I had stated to General Lovell that I believed, it impossible to take it. I had inky conversation with Colonel Hobson characterized the attempt as madness. I believe at the en of the first day's fight that the place was nearly taken.

Question. Do you know of any obstacle between the position you occupied on the night of the 3rd and the town and the innermost entrenchments of Corinth?

Answer. On the morning of the 4th, after marching a mile or so, we came to two forts and parapets, which I supposed were the last between us and the town. In front of this were abatis abbot 200 yards wide. It was thin and not much obstruction; not more formidable than that we had passed over the day before.

Question. Do you think it would have been practicable from the position our army was in on the night of the 3rd to have prevented large re-enforcements from coming into Corinth from the east or southeast?

Answer. Only by driving the enemy then in Corinth out of the and occupying it ourselves.

Question. What has been your experience or reading in regard to attacks made at night with troops not veteran soldiers?

Answer. Extremely hazardous, and only advisable under extraordinary circumstances, which I think existed on this occasion, as I stated before.

Question. Will you state in brief why at Tuscumbia you thought the attack on Corinth must necessarily fail?

Answer. In the first place I believed the enemy had or could have more men there than we could assault with, such were their, for concentrating, and I knew that the defense constructed by General Beauregard were somewhat formidable, and had intelligence, which I credited, that they were very much strengthened by the enemy.

Question. Were you cognizant of the strength of the enemy; did you know before you went to Corinth whether the enemy had 20,000 or 40,000 men; if so, in what way did you get t he information?

Answer. General Lovell told me they only had 12,000. Attaching no importance to this, and giving the enemy character for ordinary prudence and sagacity, I could not believe that they would attempt to hold Corinth, Bolivar, Jackson, and Rienzi,