HUMBOLDT, December 25, 1862.

General SULLIVAN:

I have just received the following report from my scouts out toward Brownsville:

Van Dorn crossed at Estanaula yesterday, supposed to attack Jackson. Colonel Dawson has passed through Dyer County to join Forrest at Union City or above. My scout says he will go toward Brownsville and look out toward Jackson.

I. N. HAYNIE,

Brigadier-General.

GRAND JUNCTION, December 25, 1862.

General GRANT:

An escaped prisoner reports that Van Dorn encamped last night at Jonesburg, on Corinth road, heading toward Corinth.

C. C. MARSH,

Colonel, Commanding.

RIPLEY, December 25, 1862-3.30 p. m.

Major General U. S. GRANT,

Commanding Thirteenth Army Corps, Holly Springs:

We have followed the enemy all day, but have not been able to come up close enough to engage him. Van Dorn left his camp, 2 miles south of Saulsbury, at 8 p. m. yesterday and moved 10 miles south on Ripley road, where he remained till daylight. They are now on the Pontotoc road and probably 6 miles south of here. i shall move on, and if I do not succeed in coming up with them to-night will camp 5 miles south, on Pontotoc road.

I joined the command at 8 a. m. this morning. I have been joined here by a portion of the Second Illinois. Colonel Deitzler came into the Ripley road 10 miles north of here, I am informed, after we passed.

If Hatch can get south of Van Dorn and block the roads we may get a fight out of them. I will continue on early in the morning. Van Dorn is making his way back to Grenada or below as fast as he can travel.

I have several prisoners, but have had no fight.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. K. MIZNER,

Colonel, Commanding Cavalry.

TALLAHATCHIE RIVER, MISS., December 25, 1862.

Honorable E. M. STANTON,

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

DEAR SIR: The necessity which has compelled us to fall back to this place it seems to me makes it obvious that some plan of operations other than that of keeping up long lines of railroads should be adopted. I have not time to write in full, but would merely suggest that at least 20,000 of our troops (infantry) should be mounted and made to scour the whole country, while those on foot could take and hold possession. Such a force could soon break up the enemy's lines of communication