On 30th of September, exclusive of supply trains, the Army of the Cumberland had in the front 2,800 wagons, 16,400 mules. Many thousand animals or were sent to the rear, but only a few hundred wagons, according to my information, were lost or destroyed. Eleventh and Twelfth Corps joined with full quota of transportation, after the 30th September. On 31st December the Army of the Cumberland reports 2,500 wagons and 13,000 mules serviceable.

Is the Army of the Cumberland to be doubled in size? And if so, will not the troops to it bring their own transportation? Will a larger train than that which sufficed to move from Murfreesborough into Georgia be necessary in the new campaign; and, finally, can such a train live? I have communicated with General Allen.

Many mules were sent to Louisville, Saint Louis, and Mattoon to recruit. These should be drawn upon. All the best teams in depot service should be sent to the field, and be replaced by reduced animals, still capable of serving in the cities. This we do here, but it will be resisted by quartermasters, wagon-masters, and teamsters in the depots, and will require your strong authority to compel.

There should be 2,000 or 3,000 fresh mules at Louisville, and several thousand recruited. I have called for reports by telegraph. To supply 3,000 more wagons in any short time will be difficult. Are they really necessary?

The armies will not in all be numerically stronger than last spring, and 3,000 wagons cannot have been lost or worn out. It is important to collect existing material for the new campaign, as far as possible, instead of purchasing anew. The expenses of the past six months are much greater than ever before, and our appropriations are giving out. When should the new outfit start? To avoid consumption of supplies difficult to get to the front, the animals should be held in the rear as long as possible. Not being advised as to your present intentions as to movements, I am unable to give instructions. Do not allow any calls not really necessary. Our difficulties are for money, rather than men.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. THOMAS,

Assistant Quartermaster-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, February 8, 1864.

Major-General GRANT,

Nashville:

Your dispatch of 2[.30] p.m., February 6, was received that evening, but only so much of it could be translated as to make me understand that I am expected to detach from my command 10,000 men, in addition to Stanley's division, and to report when I can start. I can start a portion of the additional troops day after to-morrow, but I do not see how they can be fed in an exhausted country until the railroad is completed to Loudon. I am in hopes to get the railroad completed and in operation to Loudon by Thursday next. These 10,000 should be replaced by troops from Logan's command immediately else the enemy might take advantage of my move toward Knoxville and attack and capture this place. It will require an entire division to hold the railroad secure from here to Loudon.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, February 8, 1864.

Brigadier General JOHN A. RAWLINS,

Chief of Staff, Nashville, Tenn.:

Scouts and deserters say Cleburne's division at Tunnel Hill; Anderson's, Breckinridge's, Stewart's, at Dalton; Cheatham's ordered to