After the first great attack and repulse the enemy made several feeble demonstrations, and until 9 o'clock in the evening formed and advanced upon the Columbia pike three or four times. I think these movements were made to keep us from moving, or to ascertain the very moment we left. At the commencement of the engagement word came that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing at Hughes' Ford, and calling upon me for support for our cavalry. General Wood was directed to send a brigade, and General Beatty's brigade had started, when information came that our cavalry had driven the rebels back and the re-enforcements would not be needed. General Kimball's division, holding the extreme right of the line, had comparatively an easy thing of this fight; being well posted behind breast-works, their volleys soon cleared their front of rebels. One brigade, Colonel Kirby's, only had the opportunity to fire one volley, and this was a very effective one, at a rebel brigade which endeavored to move obliquely across our front to gain the right bank of the river. It having been determined to withdraw the troops to Nashville, they were directed to leave the line at midnight, the flanks withdrawing first and simultaneously, the pickets to be withdrawn when all the troops had crossed. Some villain came very near frustrating this plan by firing a house in Franklin; the flames soon spread, and the prospect was that large fire would court, which, lighting up objects, would make it impossible to move the troops without being seen. My staff officers and General Wood's found an old fire engine, and getting it at work, the flames were soon subdued and the darkness was found to be increased by the smoke. At midnight the withdrawal was made successfully, although the enemy discovered it and followed our pickets up closely.

General Wood's division remained on the north side of the Harpeth until 4 o'clock in the morning as rear guard, destroying the bridges before he left. The enemy indulged in a furious shelling as soon as they found we had left. Int he fight of the day before their artillery had not come up, and but two batteries were used upon us. These two batteries threw shells into the town during the entire fight.

The march was continued to Nashville without interruption; the troops made a short halt at Brentwood to get breakfast and allow the trains to move on. Our men were more exhausted physically than I have ever seen them on any other occasion. From November the 23rd, when we left Pulaski, until arriving at Nashville we had been constantly in the immediate presence of an enemy we knew to be vastly superior to us in numbers, closely watching to attack us at disadvantage. With us both mind and body were kept at full stretch, and it was only by night marching and the constant use of entrenchments that we could hope to save ourselves. Many of our men were overtaxed and broke down; unable to travel any longer, they fell into the hands of the enemy. On two occasions the enemy was very near obtaining the advantage he sought of us-the first was when Cox drove back his advance, just about entering columbia; the second and greatest escape for ours was at Spring Hill, where, with a whole corps in line of battle, the left of the line within 600 yards of the road, they allowed all our army, excepting Wagner's division, which had fought them during the day, to pass them with impunity in the night. Upon arriving at Nashville I turned the command of the Fourth Corps over to Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood, and took advantage of leave of absence on account of my wounds.

Before closing this report I must mention the distinguished and faithful service rendered by some of the officers of my command. To Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood I am under more than ordinary obligation for