fierce encounter of several minutes drove them from the position, to which I moved forward at once and occupied with my front line. Advancing my skirmish line again I found the enemy strongly posted behind entrenchments, protected by an abatis on a double ridge, the declivity of the ridge forming a gap through which the turnpike passes. I ordered the Sixth Ohio Battery (Lieutenant Baldwin) to at once take position on the ridge occupied by my line, and the commanding general of the corps placed another battery on my right on the same elevation, from which they did good service in shelling the position of the enemy and battering down his defenses. About 2 p. m. I received an order from Brigadier-General Wood, commanding the corps, to carry the line of defenses in my front on the left of the turnpike by assault. I accordingly directed Colonel Post, commanding Second Brigade, to place his command in position to assault the works, and disposed the First Brigade (Colonel Streigth) to support him, bringing up my reserve brigade (Colonel Knefler) to occupy the line from which the other brigades withdrew, and which had already been partially barricaded. About 3 p. m. the order was given and the Second Brigade dashed gallantly forward, and under a withering fire of musketry and artillery made every effort to obtain possession of the stronghold of the enemy. The First Brigade (Colonel Streight) supported them nobly, and moving forward with alacrity endeavored to carry the lines, but the position was too strongly defended to be carried, and the withering fire of the enemy's infantry and artillery made it entirely impossible to hold the advanced position we had gained, and my troops were withdrawn to their former position on the ridge. The loss in my command in this encounter was very heavy, among which was some of my best officers. Colonel Post, commanding Second Brigade, was seriously wounded, as was also two members of his staff. Lieutenant-Colonel Hart, commanding Seventy-first Ohio, was wounded, also Major Strong, commanding Forty-ninth Ohio.

The enemy did not attempt to follow up our withdrawal, but remained behind their entrenchments, a few of them venturing over to rifle the persons of our dead and wounded who had fallen nearest their works. As the command retired I deployed a skirmish line in the position which it had formerly occupied, within 300 yards of the enemy's main works. The assault was not a success, because of the impossibly to carry a position so stubbornly defended, and with so many obstructions placed to prevent the troops from reaching the main work with anything like a formation or organization. The enemy either discovering or anticipating this movement, hastily brought re-enformcements from his left, and from the position where I stood I saw large bodies of fresh troops move rapidly down the slope and into the works. Prisoners taken afterward state that two brigades were brought hastily from their left to re-enforce that position, and that they reached there when my advance line was only about thirty or forty yards from the works; but although not a success, I am satisfied, from subsequent observation and from conversation with prisoners, that it contributed materially to the attainment of the end desired by causing the enemy to withdraw his troops from his left and thereby so weaken that part of his line that it was carried before the troops could be moved back again after my command was withdrawn. A few men cleared the abatis, and reached the work, as was attested by their bodies being afterward found lying right up against the work and several wounded inside the work. I had but just reformed my command behind its former position when I observed an assaulting column on my right moving forward,