I reached Pulaski on the night of the 13th, and assumed command on the 14th of November.

The following is my report of operations [dated December 7] from November 14 to December 1, 1864, when the troops under my command reached Nashville, which is made part of this report:

I assumed command at Pulaski on the 14th of November, 1864. The forces at and near that place were the Fourth Army Corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, and General Cox's [Third] division, Twenty-third Army Corps; General Hatch's division and General Croxton's brigade of cavalry were in front of Pulaski, along Shoal Creek, and Colonel Capron's brigade was near Pulaski. My effective force was 18,000 infantry and four brigades of cavalry. The enemy, under General Hood, was lying about Florence, preparing for an aggressive movement. His force consisted of the old army of Northern Georgia, which had opposed General Sherman during the latter part of his operations, increased by such fragments as could be collected in Alabama and Mississippi, together with all of Forrest's cavalry. The enemy's force was variously estimated at from 30,000 to 40,000 infantry, and from 10,000 to 20,000 cavalry; the largest estimate for the infantry and the smallest for the cavalry are most probably nearly accurate.

November 19, Hood commenced his advance via Lawrenceburg and Waynesborough toward Columbia. His advance reached Lawrenceburg and drove our cavalry from that place on the 22nd. I sent all the public property from Pulaski to Columbia, and fell back to Lynnville, and then to Columbia. My advance [General Cox's division] reached that place on the morning of the 24th, just in time to beat back a large rebel force which was driving in General Capron's cavalry from Mount Pleasant. At Columbia I was re-enforced by one brigade and two regiments of General Ruger's division, Twenty-third Corps, the other half of that division having been sent, by order of the major-general commanding, to guard Centerville and other crossings of Duck River below Columbia.

The troops were put in position covering the pontoon bridge on the pike at Columbia and the railroad bridge two miles below. The position was much too extended for the troops I then had, but re-enforcements were expect daily, and it was essential to have that position from which to take the offensive when our force should become sufficiently large. Therefore I determined to hold it as long as possible. I also entrenched an interior line covering the railroad bridge, and short enough to be held by the Fourth Corps.

On the night of the 25th, finding that the enemy had his entire army in my front, and that he might without difficulty effect a crossing of Duck River above Columbia, I sent General Cox, with two brigades of his division, to the north bank to check any such movement, and General Ruger's troops to the railroad bridge to construct and occupy a small bridge-head at that point, and withdrew two divisions of General Stanley's corps to the interior line. General Wood's division and a brigade of General Cox's were left on the exterior line, and our picket line was maintained in its original position. At daylight in the morning the pontoon bridge was floated down the river and laid near the railroad bridge. In this way I hoped still to hold the south bank of the river until re-enforcements should arrive.

We succeeded in holding the order line during the 26th and 27th against a heavy pressure. But the enemy did not assault, and it became evident that he intended to turn the position by crossing the river above. To hold the south bank longer would have hazarded the loss of the army. I therefore withdraw the whole force to the north bank during the night of the 27th, left General Ruger to hold the crossing at the railroad bridge, General Cox in front of Columbia, and placed General Stanley in reserve on the Franklin pike, ready to meet the enemy should he attempt to force a crossing at any point near Columbia. The crossings below Columbia were guarded by General Ruger's infantry, and General Wilson had all his cavalry, save one brigade, to guard the river above. The troops rested in this position during the 28th, and I had strong hopes of being able to hold the line of Duck River until re-enforcements should arrive. But I learned from General Wilson, about 2 a.m. on the 25th, that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing near the Lewisburg pike; and about daylight in the morning that his infantry was also crossing at Huey's Mill, five miles above Columbia, from which a road leads into the Franklin pike at Spring Hill. The enemy might endeavor to reach the latter place in advance of me, and thus cut off my retreat or strike me in flank near Duck River, or both. He had already forced a column of cavalry between General Wilson and me, and cut off all communication between us. I therefore sent General Stanley, with a division of infantry, to Spring Hill to hold that point and cover the trains. General Cox was left in his position to hold the crossing at Columbia. Generals Wood and Kimball were put in line