to the line being shattered immediately on his left. From my own observation and what I have otherwise learned, I am of the opinion that the right of the Third Division and the left of the Second Division, commanded by myself, were temporarily thrown back and disordered to some extent at about the same time, and from the same cause, which was as follows: General Wagner's division, of the Fourth Army Corps, occupied a line of both sides of the Columbia turnpike in front of our main line, and did not retire until either forced back the enemy, or until the enemy was so close as to be enabled to follow at its heels, and strike our breast-works at the Columbia turnpike close after, thus preventing an effective fire of our infantry or artillery at this point on the approaching lines of the enemy. General Wagner's division, of the Fourth Army Corps, also in coming in on so small a portion of our line disorganized it to a considerable extent by its pressure and by the hurry of its movements and its disorganized and crowded condition, inevitable under the circumstances.

It was an error that General Wagner's division should have remained so long in front of the line that the enemy's masses were enabled to crowd it back and follow it pell-mell on to our main line. On whom the responsibility for such a condition of things rests is better known to my superior officers on the field than to myself. The advantage gained by the enemy was but temporary, our lines being soon restored, and the repeated attempts thereafter made by the enemy to force us from the position were successfully resisted and the position firmly held by us, and the enemy in every instance repulsed with loss. After a short interval, under cover o approaching darkness and the obscurity caused by the settling of the smoke on the field, the enemy made another fierce and persistent attack in heavy force, covering so far as may line was concerned, from near the right of the division to its extreme left. This attack was made with great boldness, the enemy in some place reaching the breast-works and attempting to force our line with the bayonet. Our men at this juncture behaved gallantly, defending their breast-works and repulsing the enemy's attack with the bayonet wherever occasion required, making a considerable capture of men and officers, among the latter several field and staff officers. After the repulsing of this the second heavy attack of the enemy, some further attempts, but comparatively slight, were made on the line up to as late as about 9 o'clock in the evening. The forces of the enemy actually engaged in the attack on the position held by our army, so far as I was able to learn from prisoners, were the corps of the rebel Generals Cheatham and Stewart and one division of the corps commanded by General S. D. Lee.

All things considered, this battle of Franklin is one of the most remarkable of the war, both for the bravery, energy, and persistence of the attack by the enemy, he continually bringing up fresh troops, apparently confident that each new effort would enable him to force our lines, and also for the courage, firmness, and patience with which his repeated attacks were received and repulsed by our men.

Considerable captures were made by the division, of officers and men, the precise number of which I do not know, as the prisoners were at once passed to the rear. From my personal observation I should judge the number to be from 150 to 200 men.

The division remained in position until 12 o'clock at night, soon after which time, in accordance with orders, it withdrew to the north bank of the Harpeth River and took up its march for Brentwood with the rest of the army.