on the left, it was discovered that the enemy had taken position at the base of a chain of hills called the Brentwood Hills, with a front nearly perpendicular to our line, and had strongly entrenched themselves by throwing up breast-works and massing artillery in every available position. Changing my front by a half wheel by brigades, the command moved slowly in echelon from the right, so as not to break connection with the Fourth Corps, and took a position directly in front of the enemy at a distance of about 600 yards, my right resting at the base of a hill on the top of which was the enemy's left, and my line, being the whole front of the two divisions, extending about one mile. The enemy opening a heavy artillery fire upon my brigade as they went into position, all the batteries of the First and Second Divisions, six in number, were brought into action at a distance of about 800 yards, and after a fierce cannonading of about two hours succeeded in quieting the enemy's guns in our front. The Twenty-third Corps was on my right in the entrenchments thrown up by them the night before, and nearly at right angles with my present line. Expecting that corps to take the initiative, as they were on the flank of the enemy, I held the command in its present position, keeping up a slow artillery fire at their line without eliciting any reply. About 1 o'clock I received a request from General Schofield, and a few minutes later an order from you, to send another division to his assistance, he having retained the one sent at daylight that morning. Not having any reserve, and my whole line being immediately in front of the enemy and liable to be attacked and broken at any point, where even a brigade should be withdrawn, I therefore sent a staff officer to him to state the condition of my command and ascertain if he could not get along without the division. The officer reported to me that General Schofield's line was not engaged, and upon the condition being reported to him, that he said he did not need the additional force, consequently it was not sent.

About 3 p.m. General McArthur sent word that he could carry the hill on h is right by assault. Major-General Thomas being present, the matter was referred to him, and I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from General Schofield, to whom he had sent. General McArthur, not receiving any reply, and fearing that if the attack should be longer delayed the enemy would use the night to strengthen his works, directed the First Brigade, Colonel W. L. McMillen, Ninety-fifth Ohio Infantry, commanding, to storm the hill, on which was the left of the enemy's line, and the Second and Third Brigades of the division to attack in front when the First should be half-way up the hill. Accordingly, Colonel McMillen formed his brigade in two lines, with the One hundred and fourteenth Illinois Infantry, Ninety-third Indiana Infantry, and Tenth Minnesota Infantry in the first, and the Seventy-second Ohio and Ninety-fifth Ohio in the second line, and gave his men orders not to cheer or fire a shot until the works should be gained. Throwing out a strong party of skirmishers, under a rapid fire from them and his artillery, he commenced the ascent. He had no sooner fully commenced his movement than the Second Brigade, Colonel L. F. Hubbard, commanding, eager in emulation, also took up the attack, immediately followed the Third Brigade, and, lastly, the Second Division. The enemy opened with a fierce storm of shell, canister, and musketry, sadly decimating the ranks of many regiments, but nothing save annihilation could stop the onward progress of that line. Sweeping forward, the right of the line up the hill and the left through mud and over walls, they gained the enemy's works, calling forth