river as far up as Carthage. Having heard from his scouts that a rebel force had taken post at Lebanon, by the assistance of gun-boats sent for that purpose, on the night of the-he crossed the river with a strong force, well mounted, and a reconnaissance to and beyond that place, but found no enemy.

On the 11th of December, in pursuance of instructions from Major-General Thomas, I ordered Brigadier General E. M. McCook to take his battery and Watkins' brigade toward Bowling Green, till he met La Grange's brigade, and with the united force go in pursuit of General Lyon, who crossed the Cumberland River blow Clarksville on the 9th of December, and was supposed to be marching via Hopkinsville to destroy Green River bridge, on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. General McCook came up with the rebels on the morning of the 16th at Hopkinsville, and after a sharp fight captured two pieces of artillery and drove them from the place. They retreated rapidly toward Green River, pursued by La Grange's brigade. So closely was Lyon followed by La Grange's brigade that he was compelled to disband his conscripts and leave many of his men. With the balance he pushed on through Madisonville, Ashbysburg, and Elizabethtown, crossing Tradewater, Green River, and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad in his route. La Grange was greatly delayed by the muddy roads, swollen streams, and the destruction of the brigades and boats. The pursuit was relinquished at Hodgensville, Lyon's command having become reduced [to] 400 or 500 men, more bent on escaping from Kentucky then to inflict injury upon the force sent against him. For a detailed account of the operations of General McCook's command I respectfully refer you to his report submitted herewith.*

On the 9th of November [December] I received orders from Major-General Thomas to move my command to the south side of the Cumberland, to take position between the Hillsborough and Hardin pikes, and to be in readiness to join in the attack against General Hood the next day. But a heavy rain setting in General Thomas delayed his operations. Snow, sleet, and intense cold followed, covering the ground so thickly with ice as to render it impossible to move cavalry not specially shod for such an occasion. In fact, neither infantry nor cavalry could have marched over a country so undulating and broken as that separating our lines from those of the enemy. On the evening of the 11th the weather changed and the ice began to melt. The Cavalry Corps, all detachments having been drawn in in the morning, began crossing, and by eight was in the position assigned it, ready to move against the enemy as soon as the condition of the ground would allow it. By the night of the 14th everything seemed favorable; officers and men confident of the result that would follow a well directed attack. In the order of battle made by General Thomas the cavalry was directed to attack upon the right of the infantry, conform o its movements, drive the enemy's forces from the Charlotte and Hardin turnpikes and the banks of the Cumberland at Bell's Landing, turn and envelop the enemy's left flank, and, if possible, strike them in the rear. In making arrangements to comply with these instructions I conferred the night before the battle with General A. J. Smith, commanding the Detachment of the Army of the Tennessee. His troops having been engaged in holding that part of the defenses from the Hillsborough pike westward to the river, it was necessary for them to assemble in such a way as not to encumber the ground upon which the cavalry was to operate. To accomplish this

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*See p. 791.

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36 R R-VOL XLV, PT I