HDQRS. MEMPHIS AND CHARLESTON R. R. DEFENSES, Huntsville, Ala., January 3, 1865.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the capture and destruction of Paint Rock bridge, on the 31st ultimo, the facts not having been obtained by me until to-day:

When I left Stevenson on the 19th ultimo, under orders from the general commanding to reoccupy this place and the railroad, I received written orders to leave fifty infantry and verbal orders to leave one piece of artillery and twenty mounted cavalry at Paint Rock bridge. I reached there on the morning of the 20th ultimo, and left the piece of artillery, the twenty cavalry, and Company G of the Thirteenth Wisconsin Veteran Volunteer Infantry, fifty-six strong, the whole commanded by Second Lieutenant Samuel C. Wagoner, Company G, Thirteenth Wisconsin. I also left a corporal and one man of Battery D, First Missouri Light Artillery, to drill a gun squad which I directed to be detailed from the infantry to work the piece. These, together with Captain Kennimer's company of home scouts, nominally about thirty strong, constituted the garrison of the place. I spent considerable time with Lieutenant Wagoner, and gave him full and explicit directions to place the gun upon an elevation northeast of the bridge, to encamp his command near it on the same elevation, to immediately fortify his position by throwing up a redoubt of logs, earth,a nd rock on the summit of the elevation, giving him specific directions to carry up the face toward the mountain,which approaches quite near the bridge at that point, sufficiently high to protect the gunners in case of attack from point, sufficiently high to protect the gunners in case of attack from sharpshooters in the mountain, to put every team necessary, of which there were several at the place, and every available man, upon this work immediately, and press it to an early completion, and to picket thoroughly every approach to his camp, throwing out his cavalry as vedettes. I endeavored to impress upon his mind that he was liable to attack at any time, and that the utmost vigilance on his part was required to save him from disaster. About a week afterward I received a note from Lieutenant Wagoner] stating that he had information that there was a large force of rebels in the vicinity of Claysville, on both sides of the rive, the substance of which I telegraphed to you, and the reply of the general commanding, which was immediately forwarded to the lieutenant, reiterated in the strongest language the instructions which I had already given him. I deeply regret the necessity which compels me to state that Lieutenant Wagoner entirely disregarded the most vital of the orders. He did not fortify his position, and he put out no picket, except one man on the bridge,a nd had no camp guard, except one sentinel at the gun,a nd, incredible as it seems,although he had notice from several soured on Friday evening that the enemy were within a few miles of him in force, he did not increase his pickets or take a single precaution to guard against surprise. The attack was made by the combined forces of Mead and Johnson, and that of Whitecotton front he other side of the river, amounting in all, as nearly as I can learn, to about 400 men,m at 4 o'clock in the morning. The enemy came from the mountain east of the camp, and was first discovered but he sentinel at the gun. He fired, and gave the alarm, but before the camp could be aroused the whole force was in it, and the garrison overpower and most of it captured. The lieutenant and 37 men of Company G and 1 artilleryman were captured. Nineteen of Company G, the other artilleryman, the cavalry, and the home scouts escaped; only a few of the latter were in camp, the balance being absent on a scout. The prisoners were taken to the river by