railroad communications in Mississippi and Middle for the transportation of supplies, an to direct Major-General Forrest, who was then operating in West Tennessee, to report to General Hood with his command.

While en route to Gunter's Landing I learned, casually and to my surprise,t hat the line of march of our forces had been changed to one in the direction of Decatur, at which point I overtook it, and where the enemy was found strongly entrenched. As it was impossible to effect a crossing without great nad unnecessary sacrifice of life, it was now judged proper by General Hood to attempt a passage, first, at Lamb's Ferry, that failing, then at Bainbridge, or, finally, at Tuscumbia, which had become our base of supplies. He determined, however, soon after had become our base of supplies. He determined, however, soon after leaving Decatur, to undertake the passage of the river at the latter point, which he reached on the 30th of October. There and at Florence, on the opposite or north bank of the Tennessee, he remained until the 21st of November.

The effective strength of the force at this date was as follows: Three corps-infantry, 25,085; artillery, 2,200; total, 27,285.

No report has been received of the strength of the cavalry. Jackson's division consisted of three brigades, estimated at 2,000 men; General Forrest's command estimated at 3,500 men, and General Roddey's at 2,000; making an aggregate of 34,785.

General Roddey with his command was ot cover the line of communication form Tuscumbia to Corinth, and thence toward Meridian.

When it become apparent that Sherman (still at Atlanta) was dividing his army by assembling two corps, the Fourth and Twenty-third, (about 20,000 infantry and artillery), at Pulaski, Hunstville, and Decatur, it was determined by General Hood, after a discussion between us, that our army should move promptly into Tennessee and strike the enemy before a junction could be effected with the forces of J. J. Smith (about 8,000 effective), known to be moving from Missouri, and of Steele (about the same strength), form Arkansas. To this end our forces were to be thrown forward as speedily s possible form Florence to Lawrenceburg, and thence either to Pulaski or Columbia, as circumstances might indicate; and I repeated my orders to General Forrest to form a junction with the Army of Tennessee in the direction of Lawrenceburg or Waynesborough, making first, however, a demonstration toward Columbia to distract and harass the enemy. The movement of the Army of Tennessee did not commence, however, on the 9th of November,as arranged, and I addressed General Hood, on the 15th of that month, a communication,f rom which the following are extracts:

My purpose was to call again your attention, as I did yesterday, first, tot he necessity of guarding well your right flank and rear in advancing toward Lawrenceburg and Pulaski against a sudden movement of the enemy form Huntsville or Athens across the Elk River; second, to the necessity of securing from the passage of the enemy's gun-boats another point above Savannah or Clifton, besides Florence, for the army to recross the Tennessee in case of disaster; third, to the necessity of giving still greater protection to Coringh and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to that point. * * *

I was aware that those points had already been discussed between us, but my anxiety for the safety or the troops under your command made it incumbent upon me to call again your attention to those important matters. * * *

General Taylor and myself will always be anxious to aid you in your present campaign with all the means at our control; but these being limited, ample previous notice for what may be required should be given, to enable us to make all necessary preparations. * * *

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General.