HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Near Nashville, Tenn., December 11, 1864.

SIR: On the 21st of November, after a delay of three weeks, caused by the bad condition of the railroad from Okolona to Cherokee, and of the dirt road from the latter point to Florence, and also by the absence of Major-General Forrest's command, this army moved forward from Florence, Major-General Cheatham's corps taking the road leading toward Waynesborough and the other two corps moving on roads somewhat parallel to this, but more to the eastward, with the cavalry, under General Forrest, in their advance and upon their right flank. The enemy's forces were concentrated at this time at Pulaski, with some force also at Lawrenceburg. I hoped to be able to place our army between these forces of the enemy and Nashville; but they evacuated Pulaski upon the 23rd, hearing of our advance (our cavalry having previously driven off their forces at Lawrenceburg), and moved rapidly by the turnpike and the railroad to Columbia.

The want of a good map of the country, and the deep mud through which the army marched, prevented our coming up with the enemy before they reached Columbia, but on the evening of the 27th of November our army was placed in position in front of the enemy's works at Columbia. During the night, however, they evacuated the town, taking position on the opposite side of the river about a mile and a half from the town, which was considered quite strong in front.

Therefore, late in the evening of the 28th of November, General Forrest, with most of his command, crossed Duck River a few miles above Columbia, and I followed early in the morning of the 29th with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, leaving the other divisions of Lee's corps in the enemy's front at Columbia. The troops moved in light marching order, with only one battery to the corps, my object being to make a rapid march on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin pike, and by placing the troops across this pike at or near Spring Hill to cut off that portion of the enemy. The cavalry engaged the enemy near Spring Hill about midday, but their trains were so strongly guarded that they were unable to break through them. About 4 p. m. our infantry forces, Major-General Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy about two miles from Spring Hill, through which the Columbia and Franklin pike passes. The enemy were at this time moving along this pike, with some of their troops formed on the flank of their column to protect it. Major-General Cheatham was ordered at once to attack the enemy vigorously and get possession of this pike, and, although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Darkness soon came on, and to our mortification the enemy continued moving along this road, almost in ear-shot, in hurry and confusion, nearly the entire night.

Thus was lost the opportunity for striking the enemy for which we had labored so long - the best which this campaign has offered, and one of the best afforded us during the war. Major-General Cheatham has frankly confessed the great error of which he was guilty, and attaches all blame to himself. While his error lost so much to the country, it has been a severe lesson to him, by which he will profit in the future. In consideration of this and of his previous conduct I think that it is best that he should retain for the present the command he now holds.

Before daylight next morning (30th of November) the entire column of the enemy had passed us, retreating rapidly toward Franklin, burning

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