Stovall to halt his brigade and put it in position, I soon after ordered the battery and regiment supporting it to withdraw, and rode off to take command of the division. Too much praise cannot be awarded the officers and men of this battery for the coolness and deliberation with which they managed their guns under these trying circumstances. Upon coming up with the division, being unable to find Brigadier-General Stovall, I ordered Colonel A. Johnson, the senior colonel, to take the command and halt it in a position which I indicated. In a few moments the whole division and Pettus' brigade were in line. This occurred in about one mile of the breast-works. Night soon coming on, Holtzclaw's brigade was placed across the road, with skirmishers in front, and the balance of the command moved off toward Franklin. About 2 o'clock at night it was halted seven miles from Franklin and bivouacked until 5 o'clock. Daylight on the morning of the 17th found us in position at Hollow Tree Gap, five miles from Franklin, Stovall's brigade and a section of Bledsoe's battery being upon the right and Pettus' brigade upon the left of the road, and the other two brigades in rear. About 8 a. m. the enemy's cavalry made their appearance, driving in our own cavalry in a most shameful manner, a few pursuing them even through the line of infantry and cutting with their sabers right and left. A few shots from the infantry, however, drove them back, with the loss of a stand of colors. About 9 a. m. they again advanced upon this position, when we succeeded in capturing about 100 men, with their horses, and another stand of colors. At about 10 a. m. we were withdrawn from this position and crossed Harpeth River a few miles from this place. After some slight skirmishing we were relieved by Major-General Stevenson's division. For the particulars of the capture of seventy-five officers and men of Holtzclaw's brigade, and a like number from Gibson's brigade, I refer to the reports of their respective brigade commanders. For this occurrence I think no one to blame but our cavalry, who, all the day long, behaved in a most cowardly manner. It is proper, however, that I should make one bright exception to this general remark: I refer to the case of Colonel Falconnet, commanding aa brigade, who, when about to cross the Harpeth River, seeing the enemy charging upon Gibson's brigade, drew his revolver, and gathering less than 100 brave followers, dashed upon the enemy, more than twenty times his number. After having been relieved, as above stated, by General Stevenson, the division was moved on slowly, halting occasionally so as to keep within a short distance of his command. Six miles south of Franklin, the division being at a halt in the road, I learned that the enemy were moving around General Stevenson. I immediately placed my command across the road, Stovall's brigade, Colonel R. J. Henderson commanding, on the right, Gibson's in the center, and Holtzclaw's, Colonel Bushrod Jones commanding, upon the left. Hearing considerable firing in the rear I ordered Colonel Jones to move Holtzclaw's brigade forward in line of battle, keeping his right resting on the pike, so as to render any assistance that might be necessary to General Stevenson. Having given some general instructions to General Gibson as to keeping out skirmishers and scouts, I directed him to take command of the two brigades, and with my staff rode up the pike to communicate with General Stevenson. Upon coming up with Colonel Jones I learned that the enemy in large force was forming upon his left as if for the purpose of charging. I then rode forward and informed General Pettus, whose brigade was near by, of the disposition I had made for his support, and started back to where I had left General Gibson with the two brigades;