house and threatened my left. I detached Brigadier-General Reynolds with his brigade from my right, filling his place by extending the other two, and sent him to oppose this force. With his left connected with Cantey's brigade he formed his line diagonally across the woods, his left refused, and deployed his command to lengthen his front, as the enemy extended his lines still farther to our left. I sent Major D. W. Sanders, Major-General French's assistant adjutant-general, who had been serving with me during the day, to the lieutenant-general commanding to advise him of the situation of my line, and to say that unless Reynolds was supported he could not hold the enemy back with his attenuated line. He replied that he had already applied for troops to put on my left, who were reported on the way. Troops came, but the enemy were not checked. Reynolds, bravely resisting, was forced back, and it was with difficulty I withdrew my other two brigades to prevent their capture by the large force he had been opposing, which moved up in their rear. About dark, when the troops of the corps had been collected on the right of the Granny White pike, Brigadier-General Sears' brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Shotwell, numbering not more than 150 men, was temporarily attached to my command.

About 2 o'clock the following morning Major Foster, engineer officer of the corps, came to indicate my position in the new line which the army was taking up. My right rested on the Granny White pike, and my left connected with Bate's division, on the slope of a high wooded hill and near its foot, which Ector's brigade occupied the evening before. Brigadier-General Johnston, commanding Quarles' brigade, was on the right, and next line Brigadier-General Shelley, commanding Cantey's brigade, and Reynolds' brigade between him and Sears', which occupied the left. Ector's brigade was held in reserve under the cover of the hill on my left. Major Trueheart reported to me that he had a section of his artillery which he had succeeded in bringing off the day before, and, with the consent of Major-General Bate, I directed him to put it in position on the hill-side to my left, there being no suitable position for it on my own line, and this one enabling him to employ the guns in firing obliquely upon any force advancing on my position. Early in the morning from the high on my left I could see the enemy confronting us with two lines of infantry, well supplied with artillery, but during the forenoon nothing beyond a feeble assault was made on my front, but my troops all the while were subjected to a heavy cannonade and annoyed by a constant fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, but the concentrated artillery fire endured by the troops on the hill to my left was heavier, I observed, and seemed to be more effectual than that directed at any other point of the line within my view. At 12 m. I was directed to order Colonel Coleman, with his brigade, to report to the commanding general, and, at 3.15 p. m., to send Brigadier-General Reynolds, with his command, to Lieutenant-General Stewart, to be employed in opposing a force which had gained the rear of our left. These brigades, both of which did valuable [service] in holding the only passages through which many detachments of the army were afterward enabled to reach the Franklin pike, were not under my orders again during the day. By 4 o'clock a line was distinctly visible on the hills in our rear, covering much of our corps, which was the center in the army line. About this time the force in my front moved upon my position, but there was no spirit in the assault, and it was promptly repulsed without difficulty; but the hill to my left just then was carried, and to save any part of my command an immediate withdrawal was necessary. To pro-