of my line from the given point on the left. I moved my command in the position indicated, but with much delay, attributable to the darkness of the night and marshy fields through which I had to pass. The artillery I was unable to get up. The field intervening the turnpike and my position was impassable to artillery; the earth had thawed, and the cultivated low ground was an obstruction through which even the ambulances could not pass with success; hence the artillery was left in the rear for the night. Having a personal interview with Colonel Coleman, commanding Ector's brigade, and agreeing upon the point where the right of his line rested, I adjusted mine, as ordered, between that and the point designated on General Sharp's line, taking such advantage of the ground in its exact locality as I could in the night. My left then rested near the crown on that slope of the hill, facing the turnpike, and my right in the corn-field, advanced toward Nashville, hence not quite at right angles with the turnpike. Seeing that my line at its junction with Coleman's made a right angle, and the enemy already immediately under the brow of the hill annoying me with sharpshooters, within 100 yards, and my right unconnected with any one, I went in person to my corps commander and remonstrated as to the position of my line. He informed me he was not authorized to change it, and that General Stewart was to connect with my right. I at once put the men to making defenses with such tools as I had. They worked with alacrity the balance of the night (nearly all the while under my immediate supervision), and constructed works along my entire front impervious to ordinary shots.

Daylight [16th] revealed the fact that Stewart's corps had been moved back several hundred yards from the point toward which I was directed to extend my right. His two left divisions were retired in echelon from my right, Walthall's on the same side of the turnpike with me, and Loring's behind the rock wall on the opposite side of the turnpike, in echelon to him. Ector's brigade was on my left, occupying that side of the angle. It was prolonged in same direction by Lowrey's (Cheatham's) division. My line was formed with Jackson's brigade on the right, then Finley's and Tyler's in succession, with no support. The hill on which my left rested was confronted by a similar one within 400 yards and an open field in the intervening valley. On this hill the enemy had planted several rifle pieces during the night. There was a deflection on the left of this, and then a series of hills occupied by the enemy extending to its left and culminating opposite Lowrey's left in an irregular range and greater altitude than those held by us, surmounted here and there by a commanding peak. This range of hills, from the point where Lowrey's left rested, extended at right angles across the Granny White turnpike, almost parallel to and in rear of my line of battle, a distance of not more than 600 yards, with open fields between. At daylight I found a road skirting the inner border of the hills on my left over which artillery could pass, but not without difficulty. I ordered Captain Beauregard to send a section of howitzers and place them upon a small plateau making out from the declivity of the hill just in rear of Finley's brigade, from which they could sweep the front of my right and the entire line of General Walthall. A desultory fire by sharpshooters was kept up during the night and morning until about 8 o'clock, when the enemy began to deploy additional masses, advanced his lines into the woods held by Stewart's corps the night previous, where he soon planted batteries. He made a feeble charge along my front and was quickly repulsed. About this time Ector's brigade was taken out of the line and put in reserve, and I was ordered to extend to the left.