principally stragglers captured by the enemy. The bad weather and horrible condition of the road simpered our march so as to destroy one of the essential elements of success, celerity. We have had to lay our pontoons four times-over the Amite, Pearl, and Black Rivers, and Red Creek; repaired and rebuilt upward of fifteen bridges, burned or washed away; and laid mile of corduroy over the swamps of Louisiana and Mississippi, through a country so poor as to render that transportation of subsistence a matter of necessity. Our route has been throng Greensburg, Franklinton, Fordville, Columbia, Augusta-part of the command over the leaf and Chickasawha Rivers-to this point. The day after my arrival at Augusta, I found Mobile papers, herewith inclosed, containing full accounts of strength and designs; and our daily marches and progress were telegraphed to Meridian, where General R. Taylor had transferred his headquarters, and to Mobile. I threw over the Leaf regiment the Second New York Cavalry, with orders, via Leakesville (a point in my original plan of route), to cut the telegraph and destroy what of the road he could, while my main column crossed below on the Pascagoula and struck for a lower point of the railroad. Gerney was ordered, if unsuccessful and met by superior force, to fall back along the east bank of the Chickasawha and Pascagoula, and join the main column via Fairley's Ferry. But the day of my march to Fairley's Ferry, the 9th of December, the rain fell in such to torrents as to render the roads almost impassable. The rear division, Davis', was unable to make any progress, and the streams rose so between the head and rear be saved. I found from all information on the Pascagoula and Gurney's reports, who met he enemy's cavalry moving to Leakesville, that they had a force of 2,500 cavalry and artillery, consisting of McCulloch's brigade, of Forrest's command, and the Fifteenth Confederate and Eighth Mississippi, to watch and impede our progress to the road at the different crossings, while they would have time to concentrate at our designed point of attack several thousand infantry from Meridian and Mobile.

On account of the state of the roads and swollen condition of the streams, and their perfect knowledge of our movements, celerity and surprise were impossibilities. To have crossed a wheel over the pascagoula would not only, in my opinion, have involved the loss of our artillery and pontoons, but most probably that of the whole command, without the power of inflicting compensating damage upon the enemy. Weighing well all facts and chances, I decided to move my command to this point, to be transferred to East Pescagoula, from whence a constant series of threats and attacks may be made upon the railroad. My decision when made was submitted to my division commanders, Brigadier-General Bailey and Colonel E. J. Davis, and entirely concurred in by them both. Much of the information given me of the country was incorrect. I was informed that the Pearl and Pescagoula Rivers needed only 200 feet of bridge to cross them, and that, running between high banks, a rise in their waters did not materially increase their width. This is incorrect. When up, they both spread over wide bottoms, and Pascagoula, at Holden's, was over 600 feet wide. I had carried 100 feet more of bridge than I was advised to do, but was still unable to cross at that place. I ask that barges and lighters may be sent here, and the troops moved over to East Pescagoula, from whence they can successfully operate. For the last seventy miles my