tinue to act on the aggressive and extend his operations eight in the direction of Middle Tennessee or into the western portion of Kentucky. Acting upon this contingency, and with the sanction of General Thomas, I directed Bvt. Major General S. G. Burbridge, commanding the District of Kentucky, to concentrate every available man he could mount at some convenient point on the route from Lexington, Ky., to Cumberland Gap, and in order to enable him to mount as many men as possible I authorized him to impress horses wherever he could find them. Subsequently I ordered him to push his forces by forced marches to Cumberland Gap, where he would received further instructions, and went myself by rail to Knoxville, Tenn., to take the direction of affairs fin that region. On my way through Nashville I had a personal interview with General Thomas, commanding the Division of the Mississippi, learned his wishes, and received his instructions.

Upon my arrival in Knoxville I found the condition of affairs far from what could have been wished or I had expected. I immediately took measures to concentrate the forces in East Tennessee, and put them in condition to take the field. The deficiencies in the quarters and subsistence supplies were, by a free use of the river and railroad transportation, soon supplied; personal animosities were somewhat abated; crimination and recriminations by commanders, and which had extended to the commands themselves, were in a great measure silenced, and confidence was restored to a badly stampeded community.

The force under General Burbridge arrived at Cumberland Gap on the 24 of November, and according to his official report amounted to about 4,200 aggregate an four guns. On the 29th of November I directed General Burbridge to move over to Bean's Station, and to rest and put his command in condition to move in any direction at a moment's waring. General Gillem was endeavoring to reorganize and refit his command, and to that end I ordered turned oven to him ev- erything on hand in Knoxville, and which was not otherwise assigned,that he required, which enabled him to put in the field about 1,500 effective men.

The dismounted force under Brigadier General J. Ammen, and the supply and ordnance trains, were put in readiness to move at any moment.

On the 26th of November I submitted to your and General Thomas a plan of operations as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
Knoxville, Tenn., November 26, 1864.

Major-General SCHOFIELD,

Commanding Forces in the Field:

GENERAL:

The enemy, variously estimated at from 3,000 to 6,000, were yesterday between New market and Bull's Gap, engaged in effectually destroying the railroad, and I am in hopes he will remain there until we are ready to move. If he does, I propose by a rapid and forced march to concentrate all the cavalry at or near Estillville, and at the same time to move the supplies and foot up to Bean's Station or Rogersville. It is possible by this move that we may be able to reach Bristol before the enemy can, and thus cut him off from Saltville, and force him across the mountains into North Carolina, and maybe to destroy the salt-works. Should he get the start of us we can drive him up the valley, and North Carolina thus is opened up to us, and for that matter, South Carolina too. Four day's march would take the cavalry to Salisbury, from which point we could act north or south, according to circumstances. The foot, with a small portion of the cavalry, could cover our movements of fall back, with a small portion of the cavalry, could cover our movements or fall back to Knoxville, according to the necessities of the case. Breckinridge would have either to follow us, remain to guard the salt-works, or make a counted move into Kentucky. If he does that first it will be the means of effectually relieving Kentucky of an invasion, or if he does either of the two latter we shall be free to operate unmolested.