during the night of the 20th. My advance reached there at daylight on the 21st, with the main body a few miles behind. During the day we continued to threaten the place, attacking the enemy's pickets in the various gaps and avenues leading into it. That night and the next morning. The enemy left two rifled guns at Saltville; two more are reported to me abandoned on the retreat, partially disabled; I have ordered them to be brought in. The prisoners, including the wounded left in our hands, will 200. He also left at least 800 horses, being, I think, considerably in excess of those taken from our lines. Mary of his men are yet straggling in his mountains, pushed by small detachments of our forces.

The inclosed letter* from Mr. Stewart, one of the proprietors of the salt-works, will show the extent of the injury dine there. The damage to the lead mines in reported to be very slight. The greatest injury inflicted was the burning of all the railroad brigades and most of the depots between this point and Bristol. The track is not injured and no damage done beyond Bristol. From the singular positions of the opposing forces at different times, I hope the commanding general will think it proper in me to depart so far from simple narrative as to give briefly my reasons for moving out from Saltville and for retiring from the position near Marion: When the enemy turned off and advanced up the valley, I hoped to unite with General Vaughn, if he was on their rear, or if he was in their front, to attack them in rear, while his command and such offer troops as had been collected in front should engage them there. Mr. Stewart, of the salt-works, informed me that at the works no injury a raiding force could inflict would suspend operations longer than a few weeks. I supposed the lead mines to be quite as important as the salt-works. Added to this, it would not be creditable to remain there and surrender the whole department to the enemy. These were my chief reasons for following him. At the close of the action of Sunday, the 18th, affairs stood thus: I had three brigades and a battalion, but my force was less than 1,000 men. Ewery man being on duty constantly, they were becoming exhausted. One hundred rounds of ammunition per man had been provided, but the loss of Duke's ammunition train at Kingsport, the great waste from want of cartridge-boxes, and the rapid firing of the cavalry, had reduced the supply to fifteen rounds per men. The force of General Stoneman, composed of the commands of Burbridge and Gillem, was not less than 6,000 men. All of it was in our immediate from, except some 600, who were six miles in our rear, and a body moving on our left. Under these circumstances the troops were withdrawn by the only possible route to the rear of the enemy. At one time I contemplated an attempt to return to Satlville, but abandoned it for, I think, sufficient reasons.

Since I commenced writing this reported General Vaughn's has been received and is herewith inclosed.+ The 500 men referred to as moving from Marion in direction of Roye Valley was a smaller body of the enemy, which passed over to the valley and then turned off toward Bristol. General Vaughn passed thought the lead mines on Saturday, the local force leaving with him. In the evening of the same day some 600 of the enemy approached the vicinity of the mines, and fifteen of them crossing the river in a boat, infected slight damage, when the whole party retired in some haste- a movement caused, I thinks, but the sound of the artillery near Marion. It was this force that passed by our right down Rye Valley

---------------

* Not found.

+ See p. 834.

---------------