NASHVILLE, November 24, 1864-3 p.m.

Major-General SCHOFIELD,

Columbia:

If you cannot hold Columbia, you had better withdrew to the north bank of the river. From the description given, I supposed the line was sufficiently short to enable you and Stanley to hold it securely and have a reserve. But it is better, of course, to substantially check the enemy than to run the risk of defeat by risking too much. Where is Stanley? Is he with you?

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

COLUMBIA, November 24, 1864-5.30 p.m.

Major-General THOMAS,

Nashville:

I now have your dispatch of 9 a.m. I do not believe Forrest has had time to get across Duck River yet, and hope the troops you have sent will be in time to prevent him. Capron was driven in very rapidly, and by a pretty large force; Cox arrived just in time to beat it back, and punished it pretty severely. Hood had ten miles the start of Stanley at noon yesterday, but Stanley outmarched him and reached here at ten o'clock to-day. His troops are all here and in position. Colonel Moore got here last night. My orders to Hatch are as you suggest. I have not heard from him to-day.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,

Major-General.

COLUMBIA, TENN., November 24, 1864-8 p.m.

Major-General THOMAS,

Nashville:

I have examined the ground and considered the situation carefully. My troops are in position on the outer line, covering the railroad depot and bridges, and pretty well entrenched. The lines is too long, yet if Hood wishes to fight me on it to-morrow I am willing. I think he will attack to-morrow, if at all; if he does not, I must prepare to meet any attempt to cross Duck River above or below. For this purpose I am preparing an interior line covering the railroad bridge, which can be held by about 7,000 men, which I propose to occupy, and put the rest of my troops and material on the north bank of the river, ready to move as may be necessary. With the fords guarded, as will then be practicable, I think Hood cannot get the start of me. I think it best not to risk much now, for a few days delay, if we concentrate rapidly, will make us strong enough to drive Hood back. My theory is that he will now operate against the Chattanooga railroad, and I do not see how we can save it from some damage at least; but if we concentrate Granger's troops and those along the road promptly, so that they can join the main force, there can be no doubt of the final result. Please inform me whether my proposed arrangements meet with your approval.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,

Major-General.