militia, or anything that can go, now is the to annihilate Hood's army. Governor Bramlette might put from 5,000 to 10,000 horsemen into the field to serve only to the end of the campaign. I believe if he was asked, he would do so.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864-11 a. m.

Major-General THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.:

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will lose all the road back to Chattanooga, and possibly have to abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employes, citizens, &c.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864-1.30 p. m.

Major-General THOMAS,

Nashville, Tenn.:

With your citizen employes armed, you can move out of Nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to Nashville, we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads, if Hood is not speedily disposed of. Put forth, therefore, every possible exertion to attain this end. Should you get him to retreating, give him no peace.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

NASHVILLE, December 2, 1864-10 p. m.

(Received 1.15 a. m. 3rd)

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,

City Point:

Your two telegrams of 11 a. m. and 1.30 p. m. to-day are received. At the time that Hoodwas whipped at Franklin, I had at this place but about 5,000 men of General Smith's command, which added to the force under General Schofield would not have given me more than 25,000 men; besides, General Schofield felt convinced that he could not hold the enemy at Franklin until the 5,000 could reach him. As General Wilson's cavalry force also numbered only about one-fourth that of Forrest's, I thought it best to draw the troops back to Nashville and wait the arrival of the remainder of General Smith's force, and also a force of about 5,000 commanded by Major-General Steedman, which I had ordered up from Chattanooga. The division of General Smith arrived yesterday morning, and General Steedman's troops arrived last night. I now have infantry enough to assume the offensive, if I had more cavalry, and will take the field anyhow as soon as the remainder of General McCook's division of cavalry reaches here, which

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