eral operations south of the Tennessee, I avail myself of this opportunity to present for the consideration of the major-general commanding the following suggestions:

In order that the cavalry forces under his command may render the service they should in the operations of the next year, it is essential that this Cavalry Corps be concentrated at some point as nearly as may be on the line of future operations, where full supplies of forage, arms, equipments, and horses may be furnished with facility, and where the necessary measures for discipline and reorganization may be carried into effect. A camp on the north bank of Tennessee, somewhere near Waterloo or Gravelly Springs or Colbert's Shoals, would seem to possess all the requisites just enumerated-accessible at all times by steam-boats, supplies of all kinds could be brought, at slight expense, from Cairo, Louisville, or Saint Louis, the men could be kept together, and away from the demoralizing influence of large towns; ample shelter for men and horses could be erected, without cost to the Government. At the same time, the position occupied would serve as a continual menace to the enemy in Northern Alabama, Mississippi, or West Tennessee; enable us to effectually hold the line of the Tennessee River, covering the railroad communications north of it; and allow us to forage, on all the valley adjacent on both sides of the river. If necessary, one division might be left at Pulaski or Huntsville.

The perfect the organization already begun and to prepare the Cavalry Corps for efficient field service, from seventy to ninety days in camp will be necessary. Without the opportunity this length of time will afford the cavalry service must continue to be unprofitable, unsatisfactory, and without its proper influence on future military operations. The same care and attention should be given to the formation of cavalry that is bestowed upon infantry. The men of the command now scattered on detached duty, at various places from Memphis to Nashville, should be returned to their regiments, every man should be mounted on a good horse and supplied with the best arm the country can afford, and all care taken to elevate the standard of the mounted service. The Spencer carbine is undoubtedly the best fire-arm ever put into the hands of the soldier, and should be supplied for the entire command; all other arms are bad by comparison, and we have no troops poor enough to use any other when the best can be obtained. It is believed that troops armed with the Spencer carbine, or rifle, consume less ammunition than any other, and are more effective. A detailed report will be made on this question as soon as the proper data can be gathered; in the meantime, enough is known to leave me no hesitation in making the application for at least 10,000 Spencer carbines-15,000, if they can be obtained. I shall require also about 10,000 horses, in addition to those already in the hands of the troops, to complete the remount; detailed and specific requisitions will be furnished the proper department as soon as they can be made out. McCook's and Long's divisions are the only ones completely equipped for field service-in the aggregate, about 10,000 men for duty; McCook's division will, however, require about 3,000 Spencer carbines. Hatch's division (the Fifth) will require 1,500 horses and 2,500 Spencer carbines; has at present 2,500 serviceable horses. Johnson's division (Sixth) will require 3,000 horses and 3,000 Spencer carbines; has about 900 serviceable horses. Knipe's division (Seventh) will require 3,000 horses and about 4,000 Spencer carbines; has at present about 1,000 serviceable horses. The requirements of Upton's division (the Fourth) are not known, though, by the time the corps is encamped, they will be fully ascertained. If