The commanding officer of the expedition to Corinth, as well as the scouts sent out, reports the roads in an impassable condition for wagons and artillery, and that it would be impossible to make a move of any magnitude until the weather becomes more favorable. Awaiting a more favorable change in the weather, I am doing everything possible to organize General Smith's command for a long march, and also equipping and mounting the cavalry as thoroughly as possible, which I am confident I shall be able to accomplish by the time the road become passable, and shall then have afforce which will be sufficient to over-come any resistance which the enemy may be able to bring against me. In this connection I respectfully request that you will order all horses required for the remount of the cavalry to be sent by steamers to this point, rather than to Louisville or Nashville. General Wilson has a fine-location for thoroughly organizing and disciplining his command, which he can accomplish in a few weeks. He will then have a force which the enemy will be utterly unable to resist; and I earnestly recommend that I may b permitted to put my command in through shape before being again ordered to take the field. You may be assured I will not delay matters, but will be fully prepared before the road are practicable, if sufficient horses can be furnished to remount the cavalry.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Major-General, U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Savannah, Ga., January 21, 1865.

Major General GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Commanding Army in the Field, North Alabama, via Nashville:

GENERAL: Before I again dive into the interior and disappear from view, I must give you, in general terms, such instructions as fall within my province as commander of the division. I take it for granted that you now reoccupy in strength the line of the Tennessee from Chattanooga to Eastport. I suppose Hood to be down about Tuscalosa and Selma, and that Forrest is again scattered to get horses and men and to divert attention. You should have a small cavalry force of, say 2,000 men to operate from Knoxville through the mountain pass along the French Broad into North Carolina, to keep up the belief that it is to be followed by a considerable force of infantry. Stoneman could do this, whilst Gillem merely watch sup the Holston. At Chattanooga should be haled a good reserve of provisions and forage, and in addition to its garrison a small force that could at short notice ready the railroad to Resaca, prepared to throw provisions down to Rome, on the Coosa. You remember I left the railroad track from Resaca to Kingston and Rome with such a view. Then with an army of 25,000 infantry and all the cavalry you can get, under Wilson, you should move from Decatur and Eastport to some point of concentration about Columbus, Miss., and thence march to Tuscaloosa and Selma, destroying former, gathering horses, mules (wagons to be burned), and doing all the damage possible; burning up Selma, that is the navy-yard, the railroad back toward the Tombigbee, and all iron foundries, mills, and factories. If no considerable army opposes you, you might reach Montgomery and deal with it in like manner, and then at leisure work back along the Selma and Rome road, via Talladega and Blue Mountain, to the Valley of Chattooga, to Rome or La Fayette. I believe such a raid perfectly