necessary, that the army may have some rest and obtain a supply of shoes and clothing. I am assembling the army at Tupelo for these purposes. It is important that you should visit this army before the projected move, if you can leave your present position.

J. B. HOOD,

General.

CORINTH, MISS., January 3, 1865.

General G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Montgomery, Ala.:

Your dispatch of January 1 received. My dispatch from Spring Hill, Tenn., informed you of the result of the battle of Nashville, after which I thought it best to withdraw the army from Tennessee, which was done, crossing the river at Bainbridge. To make the army effective for operations, some rest is absolutely necessary, and a good supply of clothing and shoes. I think it of vital importance that the Trans-Mississippi troops should be furloughed by organizations for 100 days, and will so telegraph the President. It would be well if you could visit this army.

J. B. HOOD,

General.

UNOFFICIAL.] HDQRS. CHALMERS' DIV., FORREST'S CAV.,

Rienzi, Miss., January 3, 1865.

Major General N. B. FORREST,

Commanding Cavalry Corps, Corinth, Miss.:

GENERAL: To "learn wisdom from your enemy" is one of the wisest maxims of history. At Nashville our enemy had a large force of cavalry, but instead of wasting its strength in the front, he kept it quietly in the rear of his infantry, resting and recruiting, until the time for action came, and then he moved it out fresh and vigorous with telling effect. We have now a good force of cavalry, and there is a rich country in our rear where we can rest and recruit it; here we cannot procure forage except by taking the bread from the mouths of a people who have already suffered greatly in this war, and even this can supply us but a day or two longer. You will remember that General Bragg's cavalry were started at Corinth when he had three railroads at his command, and that this railroad frequently failed last summer to supply us but a day or two longer. You will remember that General Bragg's cavalry were starved at Corinth when he had three railroads to supply Buford's and my divisions with full rations when they had all their rolling-stock complete; but now since the late heavy destruction of corn by the enemy, and with the large increase of horses and mules of this army, it will not be able when finished to supply more than quarter rations, and until it is finished our stock must suffer greatly. We can not expect to hold Corinth if the enemy crosses at Eastport, for when the reaches Iuka he will be south of Corinth, with many roads leading to our rear; he will be nearer Aberdeen and Columbus than we are, and will have a good road without any troublesome streams in his way, while we will have three or four streams behind us that are almost impassable in winter; and if the enemy crosses at Eastport we may expect his cavalry certainly to move down on the east side of the Tombigbee and make an attack either upon our rear of the Alabama railroad, and from here we cannot intercept him. Under these circumstances, if we keep the main body of our cavalry here, we whip ourselves faster than the enemy could possibly do it, for every day that we remain here without forage we