are utterly impracticable for an army. The country would not support the troops, and provisions cannot be carried with them. The Washita River being now high, any troops occupying the country east of it would be isolated between the rivers, and must be ultimately lost, for I have no artillery of sufficient caliber to prevent the occupation of the Washita by the enemy's iron-clad vessels. It would be impossible to place in the river the system of torpedoes suggested by General Beauregard, because the preliminary preparations would necessarily be known to the enemy, and a concentration of their gun-boats would prevent the placing of even one of the frames suggested. In my opinion the only means of crossing a force, at any time, would be to occupy two points on the bank with artillery of sufficiently heavy caliber to control the river, and to support the batteries thus established with a force sufficiently strong to prevent their capture by a land force. But there is not a gun in my command which would make an impression on a heavy iron-clad, and experience at Port Hudson and Vicksburg shows that even with numerous heavy batteries the Mississippi cannot be blockaded. These reasons induce me to think that it is entirely impracticable to cross an army over the Mississippi River at this time. The utmost that can be done is to pass men in small squads, with the disorganization and demoralization attendant upon such a proceeding.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,

Lieutenant-General.

[Inclosure No. 3.]

HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT,
Shreveport, La., January 6, 1865.

General G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Commanding Military Division of the West:

GENERAL: Your letter of December 2, from Montgomery, Ala., together with a communication from Colonel Brent, assistant adjutant-general, of the 3rd of the same month, were delivered by your aide, Captain Toutant, on the 20th ultimo. Feeling convinced of the utter impracticability of operating during the winter season, I delayed answering your letter until Lieutenant-General Buckner, commanding District of West Louisiana, to whom it had been submitted, could be consulted. I inclose you a copy of his reply.* The swamps on the Mississippi are at this season impassable for conveyances, the bayous and streams all high and navigable for the enemy's gun-boats. The country has been so devastated by the contending armies and is so exhausted that the troops would require transportation for supplies for near 300 miles from the interior to the Mississippi.

Appreciating our necessities in your department and ardently desiring the transfer of this army to your aid, I am powerless to assist you either by crossing troops or by operating in North Arkansas and Missouri. The country north of Red River is bare of supplies and is at this season utterly impracticable for the operations of armies and the movement of troops. More than 200 miles of destitution intervenes between our supplies and the enemy's works on the Arkansas, near 500 of desert separate our base on Red River from the productive region of Missouri.

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*See p.765.

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