we remained inactive, awaiting the progress of events, until 1.30 p.m., when a rapid and continued fire of musketry in our front indicated that the enemy had advanced to attack our front line, and we moved forward in close supporting distance of General Thomas, to whose relief I was ordered to go in case he desired my assistance. It was not until about 4 p.m. that I received a message from General Thomas informing me that he had driven the enemy back, but had only three rounds of ammunition, and wished me to move up close enough to charge the enemy in conjunction with him so soon as he should be again engaged. In accordance with this request, I again moved my command forward to within 80 paces of the line held by General Thomas with unflinching determination, and having ordered my men to lie down to avoid the desultory fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, awaited the signal for the onset; but the enemy having failed to renew the attack, as was anticipated, I was not called on. Just when it began to grow dark, I received the order of Lieutenant-General Jackson for a general advance between sunset and dark, and commenced the execution of it by moving forward; but finding that the troops in front of me were not in motion, I ordered a halt. Shortly afterward the order was countermanded, and I bivouacked for the night.

At 3.30 on the morning of the 14th, I was ordered to relieve General Pender, on our advance line, and immediately did so. The battery of Captain [James McD.] Carrington, stationed in front of my left, reported to me for orders, and was directed not to open unless the enemy threatened us with an attack, as he would thereby attract upon us the crossfire of three of the enemy's batteries, from which the ground afforded us no protection whatever. Such, I was informed by General Pender, had been the case the day previous. From misapprehension, or some other cause unknown to me, so soon as the forces of the enemy were seen to be in motion at the distance of apparently a mile, Captain Carrington opened upon his column with rifled pieces, and the consequence, which I had foreseen, immediately ensued, resulting in the loss of 10 or 12 men wounded, with little advantage to our side.

About 10 a.m. I was ordered to throw my command forward in the field about 300 yards and occupy the line of the railroad, beyond which I had already posted my line of skirmishers before daylight. Moving in a circuitous route by the right flank, so as to screen the movement as much as possible from the observation and fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, I at once proceeded to occupy the new position assigned to me, though I found it impossible of accomplishment without the loss of several men wounded, one or more fatally. In removing four of the regiments of my brigade from the railroad, under an order subsequently received, to throw them back in a line nearly at right angles with the railroad, I again sustained a slight lose from the same cause. The skirmishers thrown out along my front kept up a brisk and well-directed fire during the whole day [twice exhausting their ammunition], and, as was ascertained by actual observation during the presence of the flag of truce in the afternoon, with fatal effect on the enemy. The enemy, contrary to all expectation, having failed to advance or renew his attack during the day, we quietly bivouacked in our position for the night, and, being relieved at 4 a.m. on the 15th by the division of Major General D. H. Hill, retired to the line of the reserve, which we occupied until it was ascertained that the enemy had entirely abandoned the field and recrossed the Rappahannock.

Although my command was not at any time closely engaged, it was three times subjected to a sharp fire, and was throughout the days of