tide and locality, admit a rapid concentration of force from one point to the other?

12th. Which of those three lines of approach was most vital to Charleston?

13th. Might not the enemy have intended a feint on Morris Island, and then a rapid concentration on James Island?

14th. How long would it have then required him to take possession of it, and what would have been result as to the safety of Charleston and its harbor, by establishing his batteries from Fort Johnston to Battery Glover?

15th. How could we have then maintained our communications with Sumter and Morris Island, his iron-clads having command, meanwhile, of the outer harbor?

16th. Was it not a fortunate circumstance the enemy attacked Morris instead of James Island?

17th. From the apparent number of troops and vessels in North Edisto, about the 10th of July last, was it not possible for the enemy to have concentrated his forces rapidly on james Island, and attempt to cross the Upper Stono, to march into Saint Andrew's Parish?

18th. Was it not, then, necessary to guard also that line of approach?

19th. From the small force of infantry in the Second, Third, and Fourth Military Districts, and the difficulties and insufficiency of our means of transportation, could much assistance have been expected or derived from them?

20th. Were not the forces in the Second and Third Districts absolutely required where they were, to the last moment, to guard our important communication with Savannah?

21st. When did they get hete, and how many?

22nd. How much infantry force was in georgia?

23rd. How many came from there?

24th. When did they arrive?

25th. Did not, in your judgment, these headquarters do all that our restricted means permitted to be done, to afford you all the aid possible from other districts, and, so far as you are aware, even from North Carolina, and from the Government itself at Richmond? (See my telegrams on the subject, if you desire.)

26th. Did not these headquarters object most strenuously, to the last, in sending troops, in April and May, to the State of Mississippi, stating the enemy's force was still too great in this department, and such a depletion would endanger Charleston or Savannah, or their communications with each other?

27th. Did not the War Department insist, on the contrary, that the enemy's forces had been greatly reduced, if not mostly withdrawn, to attack Mobile or re-enforce Banks on the Mississippi River?

28th. Was not the truth of this information doubted, if not denied, at these headquarters?

29th. Were not ample calls made, during the last six months, for negro labor to construct all the works required for the complete defense of Charleston?

30th. Were those calls answered satisfactorily?

31st. With those works completed and armed, and the troops we had then in this district, would not Charleston have been safe until re-enforcements could have been sent from other points for its prolonged defense?