reason that it has been in contemplation to make certain changes in departments and corps. The matter, however, will soon be attended to, if such changes are not made.

I have earnestly recommended that all batteries of artillery be placed on the same footing. The present law does not permit the extra pay asked for by Batteries B, D, and M, First Artillery.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief.

CONFIDENTIAL.] HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,

In the Field, Folly Island, S. C., November 30, 1863.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: I feel that the interests of the service demand that I should see and confer with you. I have no private ends to secure or wishes to gratify. We are secure upon these islands and at other points in the department, and nothing requiring my presence will be done for several days; the navy will not be ready for a month.

There are things that I wish to say to you that I cannot, and that you would not desire to have, put in writing.

I can easily arrange it so that General Terry will be in command during my absence. Do you object to my coming to Washington?

My aide, Major Brooks, is the bearer of this, with instructions to present it at your headquarters. the steamer which takes him will await him at Baltimore.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Q. A. GILLMORE,

Major-General.

[P. S.] - I go to Saint Augustine to-morrow, to inspect the convalescent hospital there.

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1863.

Honorable E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

SIR: Major-General Gillmore, commanding Department of the South, some time since recommended that a part of his troops be emplolyed in some other operation while awaiting the preparations of the naval commander for an attack on Charleston.

Dispatches received from him to-day, dated the 20th instant, state that the additional monitors expected for the proposed attack will not be ready in less than a month; moreover, that, in his opinion, the enemy's works of defense have been and will be increased more rapidly than the number of monitors for the attack, so that we will gain no relative strength by waiting; in other words, that the chances of a naval attack were greater at the time the guns of fort Sumter were first silenced than they now are or are likely to be hereafter.

General Banks is urgently asking for re-enforcements; and it may, at any moment, be necessary to send additional troops to General Grant's command. The only source from which such forces can be drawn, without endangering important positions, is from the