The labor may be entered through three different channels, the deepest of them having 11 1/2 feet at ordinary high tide. It was through this channel that the steamship Nashville entered and repassed in the summer of 1862. the other channels are not so deep, probably having not more than 7 or 8 feet of water at the ordinary high tide.

South of Georgetown, and distant about 10 and 15 miles, respectively, come the entrances to the Santees (North and South), with about equal water, namely, 9 feet at night tide.

North of Georgetown, and distant about 20 miles, is Murrell's Inlet. Into this harbor, vessels drawing 9 feet water can enter also. Having entered the narbor, however, they could not even then be altogether safe, as it is narrow and short. It has the additional disadvantage that cargoes landed there would have to be transported in wagons across Waccamaw Neck, a distance of about 3 miles, to the Waccamaw River; thence water transportation may be had to the Wilmington and Manchester Railroad, where it crosses the Pedee River.

As ports for vessels running the blockade, the Santees possess the advantage that such vessels would be able deliver their cargoes at the Northeastern Railroad, where it crosses the river. Georgetown does not enjoy the same advantage. The windings of the Pedee River are so great, that steamers with double engineers only can navigate it as high up as the point of crossing of the Wilmington and Manchester Railroad. Lightening would, therefore, have to be resorted to. But tete is at present another serious obstacle in the way of using Georgetown as a port for blockade runners. It lies in the fact that the enemy now hold the lower bay, and nothing much short of a miracle bring the blockade runner safely by, as the pass in a narrow one. The removal of the obstacle is, however, by no means an impossibility, the proper munitions only are wanted certainly to effect the end.

As having an important bearing upon the subject, it is proper I should report further, that the facilities for transportation, both by land and water, are in this military district exceedingly limited, and still further, that our means of defense, both in men and material, are so small that to provoke aggression would not only be a suicidal act, but it would also be doing great injustice to the people of this section of the country. The immunity heretofore enjoyed is due more to the fact that the region of country hereabout is not of much value to the enemy, either in a military or commercial point of view, than to the means provided to repel his attack. Give him the inducement by making here ports of entry for blockade runners, and he will not be slow to avail himself of our comparatively defenseless condition. I have no hesitation in saying that an attack, whether naval or military, with even respectable forces, cannot possibly be successfully met with the means now at my command .

It is, therefore, my duty, respectfully, but firmly and most earnestly, to protest and remonstrate against any action looking to the giving importance to this military district until better means of defense have been provided for it than it now enjoys. This region of country is susceptible of easy defense. But defensible as it is, it requires a good possesses, and to give to it importance under present circumstances is to invite aggression, and disaster must inevitably ensue. On the other hand, give us means of defense commensurate with its