council of war finally made up their minds to attack. "But on advancing on the morning of the 14th, " reports General Meade, "it was ascertained he [the enemy] had retired the night previous by the bridge at Falling Waters and the ford at Williamsport. " In striking confirmation of the sketch now given of this important battle, it may be interesting to quote a few brief extracts from the diary of a British officer who was a guest of General Lee during the campaign in Pennsylvania, and which was published in Blackwood's Magazine in September last. The writer was an eye-witness of the battle of Gettysburg, and the hearty praise he lavishes upon the Confederate troops and their generals shows that all his sympathies were with the South, and he takes no pains to conceal his prejudices against the North. Speaking of the moment when the columns of Longstreet had been finally repulsed by our left on Friday afternoon, July 3, he says: "It is difficult to exaggerate the critical state of affairs as they appeared about this time. If the enemy or his general had shown any enterprise, there is no saying what might have happened. General Longstreet talked to me, " he narrates, "for a long time about the battle. The general said the mistake Lee had made was in not concentrating the army more and making the attack with 30, 000 men instead of 15, 000. It is impossible to avoid seeing, " adds the English officer, "that the cause of this check to the Confederates lies in their utter contempt for the enemy. " He continues: "Wagons, horses, mules, and cattle captured in Pennsylvania-the solid advantages of this campaign - have been passing slowly along this road {Fairfield
all day {July 4
. So interminable was this train that it soon became evident that we should not be able to start. As soon as it became dark, we all lay around a big fire, and I heard reports coming in form the deferent generals that the enemy was retiring, and had been doing so all day long. But this, of course, could make no difference to General Lee's plans. Ammunition he must have, as he had failed to capture it from the enemy according to precedent. Our progress, " he continues, "was naturally very slow, indeed, and we took eight hours to go as many miles. " I will close these extracts with the following graphic sketch of a "stampede" which occurred on Monday, July 6, about 7 p. m., and which demonstrates most unequivocally the utter demoralization of the Confederate army. The writer states: About 7 p. m. we rode through Hagerstown, in the streets of which were several dead horses and a few dead men. After proceeding about a mile beyond the town, we halted, and General Longstreet sent four cavalrymen up a lane, with directions to report everything they saw. We then dismounted and lay down. About ten minutes later {being nearly dark
we heard a sudden rush-a panic-and then a regular stampede commenced, in the midst of which I descried our four cavalry heroes crossing a field as fast as they could gallop. All was now complete confusion, officers mounting their horses and pursuing those which had got loose, and soldiers climbing over fences for protection against the supposed advancing Yankees. In the midst of the din, I heard an artillery officer shouting to his cannoneers to stand by him, and plant he guns in a proper position for enfilading the lane. I also distinguished Longstreet walking about, hustled by the excited crowd, and remarking in angry tones, which could scarcely be heard, and to which no attention was paid, "Now, you don't know what it is; you don't know what it is. " While the row confusion were at their height, the object of all this alarm at length emerged from the dark lane, in the shape of a domestic four-wheeled carriage, with a harmless load of females. The stampede had, however, spread, increased in the rear, and caused much harm and delay. It is to be hoped that the above narrative will be regarded as dispassionate, as it is meant to be impartial. Some slight errors may