At 3 o'clock on the morning of July 2, I received orders to march with the brigade and rejoin the corps at Gettysburg. When within about 3 miles of the latter place, the command halted for a brief rest, but, being informed by citizens that the enemy's skirmishers were only a mile distant, and advancing toward the road upon which we were marching, was immediately pushed on, reaching the corps about 11 a. m. My battery was put into position in the line of battle then being formed by the corps. An hour or two later the line was moved to the left and front. The position assigned my battery was near the left of the line, in a small wheat-field near the base of Round Top hill. A battery of the enemy posted nearly in my front opened between 3 and 4 p. m. upon our lines. I could only see the smoke of their guns as it rose above the tree tops, but, by command of General Hunt, fired a few rounds of solid shot in that direction, probably with no effect, as it was evidently beyond the range of my guns. Soon after, the two lines on infantry became hotly engaged, but I was unable from my obscure position to observe the movements of the troops, and was compelled to estimate distances and regulate my fire by the reports of our own and the enemy's musketry. By direction of Major-General Birney, I opened with solid shot, giving but sufficient elevation to clear our own troops in front, and firing in the direction of the heaviest musketry, lessening the range as our troops fell back and the enemy advanced. Our line of skirmishers fell back on their supports at the edge of the woods, little, if any, more than 400 yards from the front of my guns. This line was a weak one and soon fell back, but by using shell and case shot at about one degree elevation, and from 1 to 1 1/2 second fuse, I kept the enemy from advancing from the cover of the woods. Having been just directed by General Birney, through an aide, to closely watch the movements and look for a route upon which I might withdraw in case it became necessary, I rode through the woods on my left, perhaps 200 yards in width, and found our line there formed perpendicular to my own, instead of parallel, as I had supposed, facing from me and closely pressed by the enemy. This line soon fell back irregularly, but slowly, passing in front of and masking my guns. A portion of Smith's battery, on my left, also withdrew by my rear. The enemy's advance being within 25 yards of my left, and covered by woods and rocks, I ordered my left section limbered, with a view of moving it a short distance to the left and rear. Before this was accomplished, the enemy had advanced under cover of the woods upon my right, and was cutting down my men and horses. Having no supports in rear, and being exposed to a heavy fire of musketry in front and upon both flanks, I deemed it necessary to withdraw in order to save my guns, which was done by piece in succession from the left, continuing to fire until the right and last piece was limbered. Several horses were killed and disabled before moving 25 yards. In one instance it became necessary to use the limber of a caisson to secure the piece. By impressing 2 passing horses of Captain Smith's, not in use, the former was secured. Meeting Major-General Sickles and Captain Randolph immediately after leaving the field, I was ordered by them to move my battery to the rear, and refit as far as possible. My battery was moved to the front next morning, but was not engaged in the action of that day. On this, as on former occasions, my officers and men, with scarcely an exception, manifested a coolness and bravery highly commendable, the latter in more than one instance rendering valuable aid after