ter had been thrown up for the artillery. The enemy had brought out a large number of guns, and held them in position in sight on the opposite side of the Emmitsburg road. Everything was moderately quiet until about 12 o'clock, when, as I was returning with Captain Robertson from reconnoitering a position for artillery opposite our left, the enemy opened a terrific fire of artillery, which, passing over the crest of the hill, concentrated behind the lines where the reserve was lying. Several officers and men were wounded and animals killed both in the batteries and the ammunition train. My own horse was killed at this time, just as I reached the park. Orders were given to move the whole to the rear, out of range, the cannonading being kept up for more than two hours. There being signs of an intention to attack on the part of the enemy, all the reserve batteries and one battery of horse artillery were ordered into position. Captain Fitzhugh (K, First New York Artillery) and Lieutenant Parsons (A, First New Jersey Artillery) came up very opportunely to the support of the troops of Brigadier-General Webb, of the Second Corps, at a time when artillery was much needed, and with their steady and well-directed fire rendered great assistance. After 3 p. m. the enemy moved up immense bodies of troops, and made a series of attacks upon our center, but, despite the vigor and gallantry with which they were led and handled, they could not withstand the heavy fire of artillery to which they were subjected, combined with the brave and obstinate defense of the infantry, and were hurled back from our position with immense loss. The company of the Thirty-second Massachusetts (Company C, Captain J. C. Fuller commanding) and the battalion of the Fourth New Jersey, guarding my train, were formed in line, and assisted in driving back stragglers during the afternoon's engagement. I wish to explain here that the dispositions of my batteries were generally made upon orders of General Hunt, chief of artillery, though sometimes by orders direct from the commanding general or requisitions of corps commanders. Most of the batteries in position until July 5, when they were withdrawn for the march on that day. Appended and marked A will be found a tabular statement of losses and expenditures during the battle. I believe it almost unnecessary to speak of the value of the services rendered by the Artillery Reserve during the last two days of this action and the great share it had in the glorious result. The one hundred and eight guns which were on the field were all in position, their fire being concentrated and felt wherever the battle was hottest. The skill and gallantry with which they were handled is amply at tested by the dead of the enemy, slain by shell and canister, lying in their front, and the fierce fire under which they did their work is proved by the heavy loss of horses and the long record of men and officers killed and wounded. From the ammunition train, as already stated, seventy wagon-loads were issued on the night of the 2nd to the batteries of the army, and, as shown by the report of my ordnance officer, 10, 090 rounds were issued to batteries outside of the reserve during the battle. The necessity and usefulness of the organization, I believe, is beyond a question. I would respectfully call the attention of the commanding general to the defects of a system which fails to give field officers for the