ONEL WYNDHAM'S BRIGADE; THE LEFT SECTION, UNDER COMMAND OF SECOND Lieutenant J. WADE WILSON (ALSO WITHOUT CAISSONS), IN FRONT OF THE REAR REGIMENT OF COLONEL KILPATRICK'S BRIGADE, AND THE TWO GUNS OF THE CENTER SECTION, WITH THE COLUMN OF CAISSONS, MARCHING BETWEEN THE TWO BRIGADES. THE MARCH FROM THE FORD TO BRANDY STATION WAS PURSUED WITHOUT EXTRAORDINARY INCIDENT UNTIL WE REACHED A POINT A FEW HUNDRED YARDS DISTANT FROM THE STATION, WHEN A SHOT FROM THE ADVANCE SECTION AND AN ORDER FROM GENERAL GREGG TO FORM AT ONCE IN POSITION WAS SUFFICIENT NOTICE THAT WE HAD COME UPON THE FOE. THE ENEMY HAD A BATTERY IN POSITION ON AN EMINENCE CLOSE TO A HOUSE WHICH WAS OCCUPIED BY THEIR COMMANDING GENERAL AS HEADQUARTERS, AND FROM THIS BATTERY POURED A HEAVY FIRE ON THE SECTION UNDER LIEUTENANT CLARK. THEY MADE NO REPLY TO THE SECTION UNDER MY OWN IMMEDIATE COMMAND, AND DID NOT WITHSTAND THE COMBINED FIRE OF THE TWO SECTIONS MORE THAN A QUARTER OF AN HOUR. THE DISTANCE FROM THE ADVANCED SECTION TO THE ENEMY'S BATTERY WAS ABOUT 800 YARDS, AND FROM THE CENTER SECTION ABOUT 1, 000 YARDS. WHILE THE GUNS WERE ENGAGED, AN AIDE-DE-CAMP FROM COLONEL WYNDHAM, COMMANDING THE ADVANCE, REACHED ME WITH AN ORDER TO REPORT TO HIM IMMEDIATELY WITH THE TWO GUNS I WAS COMMANDING. I TOLD THE OFFICER THAT I HAD BEEN POSTED IN THE POSITION I OCCUPIED BY GENERAL GREGG'S ORDERS, WAS FIRING UNDER HIS IMMEDIATE DIRECTIONS, AND I SHOULD CONSEQUENTLY REMAIN THERE UNTIL I RECEIVED OTHER ORDERS FROM HIM OR HIS SUPERIOR IN AUTHORITY. A FEW MINUTES AFTER THIS, AN ORDER FROM GENERAL GREGG REACHED ME TO CEASE FIRING, AND REPORT WITH THE TWO GUNS TO COLONEL WINDHAM WITHOUT DELAY. I DID THIS AS SOON AS I COULD, URGED TO A GREATER RAPIDITY IN THE EXECUTION OF THE MOVEMENT BY THE FACT OF RECEIVING THREE SEPARATE MESSAGES FROM COLONEL WYNDHAM TO "HURRY UP. " THE AIDE WHO BROUGHT ME THE ORDER TO REPORT TO COLONEL WINDHAM TOLD ME THAT I WOULD RECEIVE MY SUPPORT FROM HIM, BUT SEEING NONE OF OUR TROOPS ON THE ADVANCED POSITION, WHICH LIEUTENANT CLARK ALREADY OCCUPIED WITH ONE PIECE (THE REMAINING ONE OF HIS SECTION BEING TEMPORARILY DISABLED), I SENT TWO SEPARATE MESSAGES FOR MY SUPPORT, AND IN REPLY RECEIVED WORD THAT THEY WERE ALREADY ON THE WAY AND WOULD BE AT THE POSITION BEFORE MY GUNS WERE. DURING THE ENTIRE TIME, HOWEVER, THAT I OCCUPIED THIS POSITION I SAW NO SUPPORTING FORCE, AND HAD I NOT BEEN SO HOTLY PRESSED BY THE ENEMY I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWING MY GUNS TO WHERE THEIR SAFETY WOULD HAVE BEEN INSURED, NOR WOULD I HAVE EVER ALLOWED THE GUNS TO BE SO MUCH EXPOSED HAD I FOR A MOMENT SUPPOSED THAT THEY WOULD BE SENT THERE UNSUPPORTED. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUPPORT WAS ORDERED, BUT IT IS CERTAIN THAT IT NEVER TOOK THE POSITION ASSIGNED IT. IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVING AT THE POSITION WHERE LIEUTENANT CLARK WAS ENGAGED WITH HIS REMAINING PIECE, I FORMED THE SECTION ON HIS RIGHT, AND IMMEDIATELY COMMENCED FIRING AT THE HOUSE WHICH I BEFORE MENTIONED AS HAVING BEEN OCCUPIED BY GENERAL STUART AS HIS HEADQUARTERS, AND WHICH WAS COMPLETELY SURROUNDED BY A DENSE MASS OF THE ENEMY'S CAVALRY ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY THE ENEMY COMMENCED THEIR ATTACK BY REPEATED CHARGES ON THE GUNS, BUT IT WAS NOT UNTIL THEY HAD BEEN TWICE REPULSED THAT THEIR EFFORTS WERE SUCCESSFUL, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT EVEN THEN THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOMFITED HAD THEIR FINAL CHARGE NOT BEEN MADE ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY FRONT AND REAR. IT TOOK BUT ONE ROUND OF CANISTER SHOT FROM EACH PIECE TO REPULSE THEIR CHARGES, AND COULD I HAVE REVERSED MY