to cover any men who might escape in that direction from Winchester, and for the object, and for the security of the Martinsburg baggage train, I proposed, if possible, to hold Martinsburg until sundown, by which time I supposed the baggage train would be safe, and the troops escaping in the way of Martinsburg would have arrived . The results was, he baggage train did, and not a man of MIlroy's defeated army attempted to escape by way of Martinsburg, the rebels having completely cut off his retreat in that direction . To cover the chance of a opportunity to assist Milroy, the holding on to Martinsburg until near sunset was manifestly important, and the same time offered a chance for the Martinsburg force to escape. To have held on later (say until next morning), would have done no good, and would have insured the capture of the entire Martinsburg command. Is was evident the enemy was in force, and had commenced a serious attack, and there was nothing in the character or condition of Colonel Smith's command to authorize the least hope that the attack could be repulsed, and there was every reason to believe that under the circumstances the good of service required these troops, if possible, for the garrison at Harper's Ferry. The loss of four pieces of Maulsby's battery requires more explanation than I am able to give, as I have as yet no report from Captain Maulsby. Captain Maulsby, by his conduct at Martinsburg, showed that he was a gallant soldier, and there can be no doubt but that he can satisfactorily explain his conduct in connection with the loss of his guns. Maulsby's battery, after 6 p. m. of the 14th instant, was divided, one section, under the command of a lieutenant, facing to the west, covering some rebel infantry and cavalry that were moving in that direction on Martinsburg. The other two sections, commanded by Captain Maulsby, were facing south, covering the rebel forces that were passing either to amuse or attack the forces posted on the hill near the cemetery. The detached section was 150 yards to the rear of the section under the immediate command of Captain Maulsby, and the lieutenant in command was alone responsible for the section . Just before sunset the rebels for the first time showed that they had artillery in position, as they opened fire from six or eight guns with good range. The first shot passed over Captain Maulsby's four guns, and plunged into the detached section, killing and wounding some horses, and producing a bad effect in the infantry supports, a battalion of the One hundred and sixth New York Volunteers, which fell back in disorder. For the next twenty minutes I exerted myself personally in rallying the infantry and stimulating Maylsby's two sections to serve the guns as steadily and rapidly as possible, to cover the retread, for which it was evident the time had come. Not finding Colonel Smith on the field, I then ordered Captain Maulsby to throw a half dozen shots from each of his guns as rapidly as possible, and them to limber up and follow the infantry. On riding to the rear, I found one piece of the detached section limbered up and the other rolled down the hill upset, and the limber missing, and that Colonel Smith, with his regiment had left the field, while the one hundred and sixth New York Volunteers were standing in line, apparently awaiting orders. It was evident that something should be done once, and being unable to find Colonel Smith, I ordered the One hundred and sixth New York to move to the rear, and rode forward myself to ascertain what had become of Colonel Smith and the One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio, and finding neither, I sent a