miles from Winchester . Again I moved my command from the junction to Winchester without discovering any rebels on that side of the town. Still another evidence is, that my train moved from Bunker Hill to Martinsburg without meeting any rebels on the route, with the exception that at Bunker hill a small force had been attacked by the rebels, and the rebels repulsed, showing that the attacking force must have been small-a few hundred, I mean. Captain M. L. De Motte, assistant quartermaster of volunteers, a witness called by the court, being duly sworn, answers:

By the Judge-Advocate:

Question. What was your position on General Milroy; s staff at Winchester?

Answer . I was acting division quartermaster all the time that Winchester was occupied by General Milroy's command.

Question. In your opinion, was or was not the public property suitably cared for in the evacuation of that place?

Answer. It was.

Question. What was done with the wagons, horses, forage, &c., under your directions as quartermaster for the division?

Answer. I had on my own returns 159 four-horse teams; General Elliott's brigade had 118 four-horse teams; Colonel Ely's had 35, and Colonel McReybolds 42. Of these teams, Colonel McReynolds escaped entire. Out of the 150 that I had, 114 escaped from Winchester, 9 of which were afterward destroyed between Martinsburg and Harrisburg, as I am not informed by agent. This was done by some drunken cavalry-men, and not from necessity. Forty-five of my wagons were left standing near the forts at Winchester, and all of General Elliott and Colonel Ely's were left in the same place . The division lost in all 198 wagons out of 354. This statement may vary a very few wagons from the actual number, as my papers were all lost. On Thursday evening prior to the evacuation, General Milroy ordered me to make such disposition of the trains as would enable us to move in the shortest possible time, and ordered me to have as little stores on hand as possible. I accordingly sent all my own wagons except 45 to Harrisburg, loaded with stores, retaining only about enough camp and garrison equipage to equip about 50 men. There are all the stores that I had left, and these were broken into and partly taken by our own men. My grains was nearly consumed before our departure. The horses were unhitched from the wagons about 11 o'clock Sunday night. n the morning of the evacuation, I had under my command about 800 horses . They were ridden by convalescents, detailed men, settler's clerks, and other unarmed I attaches. The harness was on the horses when we started. At the time of the attack on the Martinsburg road, on the morning of the 15th of June, my party were in column of fours, and I attempted to withdraw them to the left side of the road, in the timber. This movement was about half completed, when I presume the enemy saw it, and thought we were cavalry, and turned their artillery upon us fiercely. The horses now became frantic, and their riders, having the ordinary wagon bridles, and generally being without saddles, could not control them. The consequently took toward the left, toward Berkeley Springs instead of toward Harper's ferry, as they were ordered. I tried to rally them in a wheat-field, about one-quarter of a mile from the road, but it was impossible. Near the close of engagement, I started myself in the same direction, and at Berkeley Springs succeeded in getting together a little over 800 of my party. While we were in route from Berkeley Springs to New Creek, about 200 of these men, becoming frightened at the numerous reports of the enemy in every direction, turned off in the direction of Pennsylvania. The harness was almost a total loss ; it was thrown away or lost on the road. I did not succeed in gathering all that passed out that road. I heard of many having gone too fast to be overtaken. From the best information that I can get, about 150 out of the 800 horses were captured on the field that morning. Lieutenant William Alexander, First New York Cavalry, acting assistant quartermaster of General Elliott's brigade, had three or four times as much camp and garrison equipage on hand as I had. It was left at Winchester. I gave him the same instructions that General Milroy gave me. Afterward, when I asked him why did not send his stores away on Thursday, he told me that the most of his wagons had been sent to martinsburg for grain, and had not returned, and they did not return until Friday morning . The stores belonging to Colonel McReynolds ' brigade were saved. I think Lieutenant Alexander might have sent of his stores, with a proper guard, on